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Theory of Mind (ToM), the mental ability to represent other people’s beliefs and intentions, 
remains a faculty that is poorly understood on a computational level. While a “mentalizing 
network” of implicated brain structures exists, the interaction of these structures and their 
specific functions still requires further study. Furthermore, although it is known that individuals 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) tend to exhibit impairments in ToM, the nature of these 
impairments is not known. In this thesis, ToM is investigated through a novel learning task 
which bears a similar structure to past ToM tasks, but requires participants to update their 
representations of another individual’s beliefs and intentions continuously over time. Participant 
behavior on this task was investigated using eight different computational models. Neurotypical 
individuals were able to complete the task, answering questions about beliefs and intentions with 
an accuracy significantly above chance. Although individuals with ASD had an accuracy on 
belief questions that was not significantly different from the control group, they were impaired in 
answering questions about intent. Similarly, a computational model based on the Rescorla-
Wagner update rule was found that fit well to the control group, but this model fit much 
differently to the ASD population, and failed to perform as well in predicting ASD behavior. No 
model was found that predicted ASD behavior better than control behavior. This suggests 
heterogeneity in the way individuals with ASD compute ToM. While expanding current 
knowledge about the way neurotypical individuals generate ToM representations, these 
computational modeling results also provide an opportunity to better understand the neural 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to form mental representations of the beliefs and intentions 
of other people. Humans use ToM, also known as “mentalizing,” extensively in day-to-day life 
in order to navigate social situations appropriately and to form predictions about the actions of 
those around them. Past research on ToM has implicated several brain structures as being part of 
a “mentalizing system” (van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), primarily the temporo-parietal 
junction, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the precuneus (Rushworth et al, 2013; Koster-Hale & 
Saxe, 2013; Sallet et al, 2012; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009; Hampton et al, 2008; Rilling et 
al, 2004; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2001). However, despite a broad knowledge of which 
structures in the brain might be involved in ToM computation, how these structures interact with 
one another and with other brain areas remains unknown. Furthermore, it has yet to be revealed 
if these brain areas are uniquely specialized for ToM representations, or if they implement 
broader functions that happen to factor into social cognition (such as attention). Impaired ToM 
has been implicated in social disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Moran et al, 
2011; Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Yoshida et al, 2010a). Understanding the neural computations 
responsible for ToM is key to elucidating how normally developing individuals form ToM 
representations as well as how these social representations in ASD are different. It is clear that 
ASD is a heterogeneous disorder, and the development of a more detailed understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms might help with identifying subgroups within the ASD population 
(Yoshida et al, 2010a; Adolphs et al, 2001). 
 The focus of this thesis is on investigating the computations which give rise to ToM, 
mathematically speaking, and how/whether these calculations differ in neurotypical and ASD 
populations. A sub-question within this deals with the variance within the ASD population. 
While it is clear that within the label of “autism” lies a highly heterogeneous population with 
impairments in representing the mental and emotional states of others optimally (Schuwerk, 
Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Yoshida et al, 2010a; Moran et al, 2011; Baron-Cohen et al, 1997a, 
1997b; 1985; Adolphs et al, 2001), this heterogeneity has yet to be explored in depth in the 
context of ToM. It is unknown how much variance lies in ToM calculations in ASD, or to what 
extend this variance can account for impaired ToM representation.  
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To better understand how ToM is enacted in neurotypical and ASD populations, it is 
necessary to examine the computations which build ToM representations in both groups in 
greater depth. Here, this objective is approached by isolating different components of ToM, 
determining how individuals perform when trying to represent each component accurately, and 
subsequently generating computational models whose fit to the behavioral data may indicate how 
the brain generates ToM representations. For this purpose, a novel learning task that requires 
participants to use ToM processes in order to make predictions about an independent third 
party’s behavior was designed. While the broad goal of participants in this task – to learn about 
and represent both the beliefs and intentions of other individuals – is the same as previous tasks 
in the literature that have investigated the neural basis of ToM (e.g. Young et al., 2007; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001), this task builds on earlier efforts 
by requiring updates of these representations to occur on a continuous basis as new information 
is received over time (much like how ToM is used in real life). Additionally, this task has been 
structured so as to allow for learning and decision-making to take place with regards to these 
updates, which allows for the fitting of computational models of learning to participant behavior. 
These models representing the uncertainty of participants about the beliefs and intentions of 
other agents and their surprise (i.e. prediction error) when the agents behave unexpectedly 
(Yoshida et al., 2010b). However, unlike past research, our task does not concern a single 
vignette, but rather requires the participant (Mentalizer) to learn about a single individual 
(Agent) over the course of many trials, during each of which the Mentalizer must make 
judgments about the Agent’s state of mind and receives new information with which to update 
their representations of the Agent’s beliefs and intentions. The implementation of dynamic 
representations, as well as the fact that the Mentalizers must represent varying degrees of 
uncertainty over time, serves to mimic real life use of ToM more accurately than the single 
vignettes used in previous research. This is crucial, because if modeling of ToM is to be useful, 
the neural activity of Mentalizers must be as close to what it would be in real social situations as 
possible. 
By examining the performance of neurotypical and ASD individuals on this task, it is 
possible to elucidate the nature of the impairment in representing ToM that is evident in ASD. 
Various reinforcement learning models, fit to both groups, can give information about how a 
representation of another’s state of mind is updated with new information, as well as how this 
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updating may be altered in ASD. Using these methods, a more complete image of how ToM is 
enacted behaviorally and mathematically can be realized. The task has also been designed with 
neuroimaging in mind, leaving open the possibility that examination of MRI data of participants 
will yield more precise information about which brain areas are responsible for specific 
computations. 
 
Theory of Mind (ToM) 
The first concept of ToM – although use of the term “Theory of Mind” to describe the ability to 
infer the beliefs and intentions of other individuals did not occur until nearly 50 years later – had 
its roots in theories of child development pioneered by Jean Piaget in the early 20th century, 
which divided cognitive development into four stages (Flavell, 1963). Based on a variety of 
psychological and clinical observations, Piaget’s sociological model suggested that children 
progressed during the third stage, the concrete-operational stage (during preadolescence), from a 
position of egocentrism to one of sociocentrism (Flavell, 1963; Piaget, 1999; Fisch, 2013). Piaget 
defined an egocentric child as one unable to conceptualize situations from the perspectives of 
others, while a sociocentric one as able to consider the viewpoints of others, causing a dramatic 
shift in thought patterns and in moral outlook (Piaget, 1999). Although Piaget’s theories of child 
development have failed to be well-supported by empirical research in a larger sense (Fisch, 
2013), his identification of a “sociocentric” framework represents one of the first attempts at 
defining the ability to think about the mental states of others. 
 One of the earliest studies examining how individuals ascribe intentions to others – in 
other words, looking for a sociocentric framework – required human participants to watch short 
animations of geometric shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944). In the animation, the shapes (a circle 
and two triangles) moved around a few connected lines. When participants described the 
animation as a story in which the shapes fought and chased each other, this was taken as 
evidence of being able to perceive the shapes as beings with their own mental states.  
 However, the first actual use of the term “Theory of Mind” is relatively recent – first 
occurring in a 1978 study by Premack and Woodruff examining whether chimpanzees had ToM. 
The question was examined through means of a task in which a chimpanzee was shown videos of 
humans struggling to solve a problem (for example, attempting to grasp bananas out of reach). 
The chimpanzee was then shown photographs, one of which depicted the relevant solution to the 
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problem. The ability of the chimpanzee to accurately select the correct photograph was taken as 
an indication that the chimpanzee was able to understand the goals of the human and to find a 
solution in line with what the human would want – in other words, that the chimpanzee could 
understand a human’s intentions. 
 The findings of this seminal experiment were later called into question by those who 
suggested that correct performance of the Premack and Woodruff task was not sufficient to 
establish ToM as it could have occurred through the use of non-mentalizing inferences or by 
chance (Heyes, 1998; Povinelli & Bering, 2002). Furthermore, it has been argued that even if it 
is true that the single chimpanzee subject of the Premack and Woodruff study was able to solve 
the problems presented, this was neither necessary nor sufficient to indicate ToM because in 
subsequent studies, chimpanzees failed to perform other tasks that required ToM (Burge, 1978, 
Fisch, 2013). Interestingly, although the verdict appears to still be out regarding ToM and 
chimpanzees, there has been evidence that a large amount of social cognition takes place in 
monkeys on the neural level (Sallet et al, 2012; 2011). However, the validity of ToM in 
nonhuman primates aside, since 1978, many studies regarding the representation of the mental 
states of others have employed the term “Theory of Mind” to describe their subject matter – for 
instance, the seminal “reading the mind in the eyes” task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b, 2001a). In 
this task, the ToM of participants was investigated by showing them closely cropped images of 
eyes and asking them to identify the emotion of the individual in the image. 
 The presence of situations in which task participants are representing the false beliefs of 
others has come to be a gold standard for ToM studies. This is because an individual who thinks 
someone else has a false belief must be holding their representation of that person’s state of mind 
as separate from their representation of the actual, true, state of the world. Piaget’s notion of 
egocentrism would dictate that an individual without ToM would be unable to integrate 
information about the false beliefs of others, because they do not have the capability to represent 
any view point other than their own. The Sally-Ann task designed by Wimmer & Perner (1983) 
represents one of the earliest and most famous versions of a task testing this ability (Fig. 1). In 
the task, a participant (usually a child) is shown two dolls (or in other versions of the task, real 
people) named Sally and Ann. Sally has a marble, the participant is told, and Sally is placing it in 
her basket. When Sally leaves the room, Ann moves the marble to her box. The participant is 
then asked where Sally will look for the marble when she returns. If they are able to model the 
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false beliefs of Sally accurately, they will 
answer that Sally will look in the basket. 
However, if they are unable to represent 
Sally’s beliefs as different from their own 
knowledge about the state of the world, they 
will answer that Sally will look in the actual 
location of the marble, in the box. It has 
been shown that neurotypical children age 4 
and above are consistently able to pass the 
Sally-Ann task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), 
while children with autism are unable to do 
so even past age 5 (Baron-Cohen et al, 
1985), suggesting that they are unable to 
ascribe beliefs correctly to others. 
 Many studies have been conducted since the 
1980s aiming to better characterize how 
ToM develops in children (Flavell, 2004; 
Frith & Frith, 2003). By age 5, nearly all 
children are able to represent second-order 
beliefs (for example: “He thinks that she 
thinks that the ball is in the basket”) in other people (Sullivan et al, 1994). Interestingly, it 
appears that prior to this age (between ages 2-4), the implicit behavior of many children indicates 
that they possess ToM (for instance, glancing to the spot where a person mistakenly believes 
candy is stashed), while their explicit answers indicate no ToM abilities (Clements & Perner, 
1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001). Children as young as 18 months old will ascribe intentions to 
adults attempting to perform a task, which they will not ascribe to a mechanical device 
performing the same actions (Meltzoff, 1995). Even infants couple words and objects by tracking 
a speaker’s gaze, signaling their recognition of the intention of the speaker to refer to a specific 
object (Baldwin et al, 1996; Bloom, 2000) – although how explicit this recognition is can be 
disputed.  
Figure 1: The Sally-Ann Task. A participant is shown the 
following story with dolls or real people. Sally puts a marble 
in her basket, then leaves. Ann takes the marble and puts it in 
her box. The participant is asked: when Sally returns, where 
will she look for the marble? Paradigm originally from 
Wimmer & Perner (1983). Figure from Frith (2001) without 
permission. Artist: Axel Scheffler. 
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 While much behavioral work has been done examining how ToM develops with age, 
ToM is still poorly understood on the neural level. However, there are a handful of brain 
structures that have been identified as belonging to a “mentalizing network.” This network 
primarily contains the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the 
precuneus, the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
(Rushworth et al, 2013; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Sallet et al, 2012; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009; Hampton et al, 2008; Rilling et al, 2004; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2001). The first studies 
to examine ToM neural correlates used paradigms in which participants were tasked with 
answering questions about stories or cartoons which required ToM to fully comprehend, while 
neural data was collected using positron emission tomography (PET) (Fletcher et al, 1995; 
Brunet et al, 2000) or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Gallagher et al, 2000; Vogeley et al, 2001). One seminal study used computer animations of 
geometric objects which participants either attributed mental states to or gave physical 
descriptions of while PET scanning was conducted (Castelli et al, 2000; Heider & Simmel, 
1944). Increased activation was found in the mPFC, the TPJ, extrastriate cortex, and the ATL, 
even though the geometric shapes in no way resembled human figures, suggesting that the 
mentalizing network may be concerned more with intentions and predicting actions than with 
face processing or some other form of human-specific cognition. In another study which used 
fMRI, humans played games well-known in behavioral economics (the Ultimatum Game and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game), requiring them to represent the intentions of a partner that was either 
human or a computer algorithm (Rilling et al, 2004). Activation in the anterior paracingulate 
cortex, the STS, and the precuneus, among other areas, exhibited stronger activation when 
participants were aware of having a human partner for both games, indicating some difference in 
the circuits employed to think about a human partner versus a computer. This was the case even 
though the optimal strategies for dealing with a human versus a computer algorithm were the 
same. However, it may well be that although optimal strategies for dealing with a human versus 
an algorithm are identical, individuals changed their strategies for the human, eliciting different 
activations despite not explicitly representing ToM. 
 The mentalizing network has also been implicated in determining moral responsibility 
(Young & Saxe, 2007; 2009; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). Studies of cognitive development in 
children will often examine ToM in the context of moral responsibility, because assigning moral 
11 
 
weight to someone’s actions often depends on understanding that individual’s frame of mind 
(Cushman, 2008). For instance, Thomas Shultz and colleagues (1986) asked children (aged 5-11 
years) to imagine that they had been harmed by another child (for instance, that the child had 
broken a toy of theirs) and to decide how much punishment this child should receive. All the 
children sought more punishment for deliberate harm than negligent or accidental harm – 
showing that they could incorporate information about the intentions of others into their 
assessments of a situation.  
 An fMRI study assessing the brain activation of participants as they read vignettes in 
which individuals caused either negative or neutral effects, while they believed that they were 
causing either negative or neutral effects (a 2x2 experimental paradigm), showed that the right 
TPJ responded the most to cases in which agents intended a negative effect but actually caused a 
neutral one (Young & Saxe, 2007). This suggests the mentalizing network and the right TPJ in 
particular uses information about intentions to compute ToM and representations of moral 
responsibility in others – perhaps generating some type of moral prediction error calculation that 
quantifies the difference between intentions and real-world results. More broadly, a study in 
which participants read “moral” or “nonmoral” facts about an action’s effect or a situation 
showed that the right TPJ, the precuneus, and mPFC are recruited during moral considerations 
selectively (Young & Saxe, 2009). Even more strikingly, a causal relationship between the right 
TPJ and moral judgment was established which it was shown that disruption of that area with the 
use of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) causes individuals to rate events in which a 
person intends harm but fails to cause it as more morally permissible than otherwise (Young et 
al, 2010) – in other words, it appears that the TPJ is responsible at least in part for integrating 
beliefs held by others into calculations of moral responsibility. However, this relationship is far 
from completely accepted in the literature. For example, one recent study found that TPJ activity 
was modulated by the re-orienting of attention, even in non-social situations, suggesting that the 
role of the TPJ is more complex than at first glance (Mitchell, 2008). 
 While the establishment of ToM over the course of childhood has been well 
characterized, and key brain structures isolated as a part of the mentalizing network, the precise 
calculations underlying ToM remain poorly characterized. As the bulk of research surrounding 
ToM to date has used vignettes, whether in the form of stories, cartoons, or animations to 
examine how representations of the mental states of others are built up (e.g. Vogeley et al, 2001; 
12 
 
Castelli et al, 2000; Young & Saxe, 2007; 2009; Shultz et al. 1986; Heider & Simmel, 1944), 
there is little information on how ToM updates over time as individuals learn new information 
about a person, or how different components of ToM may update differently. For instance, it is 
possible (although unlikely) that neurotypical humans update information about the beliefs of 
others in way that is completely different from how they update information about the intentions 
of others, although beliefs and intentions are both taken to be parts of ToM. Furthermore, a 
learning paradigm affords more opportunities to model representations of thought that are 
uncertain or incomplete, and to examine the process by which they become more solidified.   
 
ASD and the Link to ToM 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a social developmental disorder, which occurs in around 1 
in every 68 children in the US at varying degrees of severity, according to the Center for Disease 
Control (Baio, 2014). Although symptoms of ASD, which include abnormal social interaction 
and communication deficits, have been well catalogued, the underlying causes remain poorly 
understood. In particular, it is understood that as a spectrum disorder, ASD remains a label for a 
population exhibiting a great deal of individual variance, although a difficulty with representing 
the mental states of others, especially beliefs, is known to exist (Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 
2015; Yoshida et al, 2010b; Moran et al, 2011; Sigman et al, 2006; Baron-Cohen et al, 1997a, 
1997b; 1985; Adolphs et al, 2001; Leslie, 1987). Many studies have shown a link between ASD 
and impairment in ToM. Children with ASD cannot perform the Sally-Ann task (Fig. 1) like 
their neurotypical peers (Baron-Cohen, 1985), even though they can perform a similar task 
where they are asked if a photograph accurately reflects a scene that is changed after the photo 
was taken, which requires no modeling of the mental states of others (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). 
Even in adulthood, impairments exist that manifest themselves in performance on various ToM 
tasks – for instance, in a version of the geometric shapes animation ToM task (originally in 
Heider & Simmel, 1944), participants with ASD provided less accurate descriptions of the 
shapes with goals or intentions than neurotypical participants, and also exhibited less PET 
activation in the mPFC, the TPJ, and the temporal poles (Castelli et al., 2002). On the task in 
which individuals needed to judge how morally permissible an action was depending on whether 
the intentions were neutral or negative and the outcomes were neutral or negative, the ASD 
group was not able to differentiate accidental and attempted harms (Moran et al., 2011). 
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Likewise, in a social hunting game where two players choose to either hunt high-value “stags” 
together or split up to hunt low-value “rabbits,” individuals with ASD showed an impairment 
with representing the strategy of the other player – an impairment that correlated with ASD 
symptom severity (Yoshida et al., 2010b). 
It has also been shown that individuals with ASD do not alter their choices about whether 
to donate to charity in the presence of an observer unlike neurotypical controls, indicating an 
insensitivity to social reputation that may be due to an inability to model the mental states of 
others (Izuma et al., 2011). When performing the “reading the mind in the eyes” task, where 
participants must ascribe emotions to closely-cropped photographs of eyes, individuals with 
ASD are consistently impaired to a degree that correlates with the severity of their symptoms, 
indicating an inability to extract social information about the mental states of others from the 
eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b, 2001a). A similar results was found in a study using 
photographs of entire faces (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a). 
However, one study showed that ASD performance is better for explicit ToM tasks than 
implicit ones, and that with training implicit ToM task performance can improve – leading to a 
hypothesis that perhaps explicit and implicit ToM are processed differently and that implicit 
ToM can be positively affected by experience (Schuwerk et al., 2015). In a similar vein, it has 
been suggested that because individuals with ASD perform better on a competitive ToM game 
than on the Sally-Ann task, which in non-competitive, deficits in ToM performance may be due 
to a lack of proper incentives (Peterson et al., 2013). Another study compared performance on 
the evaluation of emotions and trustworthiness in faces between individuals with ASD and 
individuals with amygdala lesions, and found similarities implying that amygdala damage may 
play a role in the social impairments symptomatic of ASD (Adolphs et al., 2001). 
 It is undisputed that incidence of ASD is correlated with impairments in social cognition. 
If there were a difference in how people with ASD compute ToM in comparison to neurotypical 
people, this would serve to explain a great deal of the findings of previous studies – findings that 
are for the most part behavioral and which are not conclusive (Fisch, 2013). However, the 
precise computations that the mentalizing network undertakes to represent ToM in neurotypical 
people are poorly understood, and it is unclear how much variance lies in the impairments 
exhibited in ASD (Yoshida et al., 2010a). Quantifying the variance in impairments in ASD, as 
well as investigating the places in which calculations fail to occur or different calculations take 
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place would significantly contribute to understanding how individuals with ASD think about the 
mental states of others and use that information in a social context. 
 
The Computational Approach 
In order to better understand ToM in both neurotypical and ASD populations, this thesis employs 
a computational approach by attempting to model how individuals update ToM over time given 
new information, using principles of model-based learning. Reinforcement learning is a method 
of decision making where the goal is to maximize the total reward gained based on probabilistic 
assessments about the environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998). To date, several subfields in 
neuroscience have made use of reinforcement learning to better understand how the brain makes 
predictions. The dopaminergic system, in particular, has been explored in depth using concepts 
from reinforcement learning such as prediction error (the amount by which expected reward 
diverges from actual reward) (Niv, 2009; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008; Shultz et al., 1997). 
Dopaminergic neurons in monkeys will fire when an unexpected reward occurs, but when the 
reward is expected the dopaminergic neurons will only fire for a predictive cue, not the actual 
reward (Shultz et al., 1997). When a reward fails to occur when expected, these neurons will 
exhibit inhibition. Thus dopaminergic neurons can be said to encode prediction error, and their 
behavior has been modeled accurately using a temporal difference (TD) model, which is a type 
of reinforcement learning model (Sutton & Barto, 1990; Shultz et al., 1997; Morris et al., 2006).  
A TD model, like many reinforcement learning models, is based on the Rescorla-Wagner 
update rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The Rescorla-Wagner update rule is as follows: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜆(𝛼 − 𝑉𝑡−1) 
where Vx refers to a representation (for instance, of expected reward) at a given time x,  𝛼 refers 
to the actual outcome (here, reward received) and 𝜆 is a learning rate, which affects how deeply 
the information about the actual outcome affects the next prediction of reward. So a 
representation of expected reward at time t is equal to the last expected reward plus the 
discrepancy between the last expected reward and the actual reward at that time, modulated by a 
learning rate. This example is one of the simplest possible reinforcement learning models, which 
can be altered in a variety of ways to suit a given paradigm (O’Doherty, 2012). To return to the 
example of dopaminergic neurons, a TD model takes the basic framework of a Rescorla-Wagner 
model, but instead of computing the next predicted reward, calculates the predicted reward over 
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where i goes from time t  to some time in the future. This type of model is good for encoding the 
activity of dopamine neurons because it is able to take into account situations in which there is a 
predictive cue, a time delay, and then a reward (Shultz et al., 1997). 
While the behavior of dopaminergic neurons has provided some of the strongest evidence 
for the use of prediction error and other principles of reinforcement learning in the brain when 
learning about reward (Sutton & Barto, 1990), computational modeling is applicable to many 
other types of learning, including social learning. Examining the goodness of fit of models to 
behavioral data can help to advance hypotheses about what types of computations, sub-optimal 
or otherwise, are occurring neurally (for example, Wilson & Niv, 2011; Strauss et al., 2011; 
Wunderlich et al., 2009; Seo & Lee, 2008; Daw et al., 2006) 
Some criticisms have been leveled at the practice of fitting reinforcement learning models 
to behavioral data. For instance, while computational neuroscience has gained a good deal of 
information about the functional organization of the brain and how it calculates prediction errors, 
historically it has struggled to cope with situations where uncertainty, regret or other such 
nuances have effects (Dayan & Niv, 2008). Furthermore, there exists the perennial problem of 
finding models which tread the line between being simple enough to be easily understood but 
failing to capture all the variance in the data, and being so complex that they are able to mimic 
all the data accurately but interpreting them becomes nearly impossible.  
In terms of inherent logistical flaws, there has also been push-back against “double 
dipping” during model fitting, which occurs when the same data set is used both to select the best 
models and for analysis of those models, resulting in artificial effects (Kriegeskorte et al, 2009). 
Luckily, double dipping can be avoided by simply dividing data sets into two, allowing for 
separate selection and analysis groups. There have also been concerns of “model-hacking,” or 
the over-fitting of models, which results in extremely good fits to the data but fails to preserve 
any generalizability. However, these concerns with applications of computational modeling to 
neuroscience do not represent irreparable problems. Rather they are simply issues of which to be 
aware when conducting a study that uses such an approach.   
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Social learning, like other types of learning, has been modeled in a variety of ways using 
these techniques. For instance, a computational model of the behavioral and neural data of a task 
in which participants took or ignored the advice of a partner when making choices has suggested 
that humans create representations of social value using reward-based associative learning 
techniques (Behrens et al., 2008). Another interesting study examined observational learning (the 
process by which an individual learns about an environment by watching the fate of a 
confederate) and suggested that two types of prediction error may be in use in such a situation: 
the “observational action prediction error” (actual outcome – predicted choice of others) and 
“observational outcome prediction error” (actual outcome – predicted outcome of others) (Burke 
et al, 2010). Such studies provide compelling evidence that computational modeling can 
contribute relevant information to our understanding of how social representations are formed 
and updated. 
ToM specifically has also been investigated in a computational context. Computational 
modeling has been paired with ToM to examine how individuals represent the mental states of 
others in competitive scenarios requiring game theory (Yoshida et al., 2008), as well as to 
investigate how children understand the choices of an agent through the lens of the costs and 
benefits of the possible actions available to them (Jara-Ettinger et al., 2015), and to explore how 
individuals will rationalize the actions of others though backwards-induction of their planning 
process (Baker at al., 2009), to mention only a few examples. To unravel the neural correlates 
behind the calculations that result in real-world behavior, behavioral data is first collected, 
candidate models are fit to the behavioral data, and then neuroimaging data is analyzed through 
the lens of the best models to attempt to isolate which brain structures may be responsible for 
specific components of the calculations conducted (Behrens et al, 2009; O’Doherty et al., 2007). 
By taking this approach, it is possible to pair specific components of a cognitive process with 
specific brain areas (Boorman et al, 2013; Nicolle et al., 2012; Burke et al, 2010; Wunderlich et 
al., 2009; Hampton et al., 2008; 2006; Behrens et al., 2008; O’Doherty & Bossaerts, 2008; Daw 
et al., 2006) 
 As mentioned above, there have been many studies examining ToM behaviorally and 
neurally. However, there have only been a few attempts using the computational approach in 
conjunction with neuroimaging to attempt to better understand the roles of individual brain 
structures within the mentalizing network. In one such study, Alan Hampton and colleagues 
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(2008) scanned participants in using fMRI while they played a competitive strategy game with 
an opponent, finding that mPFC activity corresponded to predicted reward for a given choice, 
while posterior temporal sulcus activity correlated with prediction error. This suggests that the 
mPFC may be responsible for modeling the complete representation of another’s state of mind 
while other areas compute the components which form this representation. However, another 
study found evidence for representations of the prediction error of others in the mPFC (Suzuki et 
al., 2012). A third study which asked participants to make choices on the part of a partner added 
an important caveat to this finding: while the study corroborated the finding that when 
performing a competitive task a specific area in the mPFC reflects the prediction error of the 
opponent, when an individual is asked to consider the interests of another individual and make 
choices for them, the neural areas which model the prediction error of the self and which model 
the prediction error of the other individual switch places (Nicolle et al., 2012). So it may be that 
the ToM area of the mPFC actually serves as a location to model prediction error for an 
intelligent opposing agenda, rather than for other minds themselves. Yoshida et al. (2010b), 
using the competitive stag/rabbit hunting game described above, also found a correlation with 
uncertainty about an opponent’s mental state in the mPFC – interestingly, they found that 
activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex correlated to the level of recursion a participant was 
employing about their opponent’s strategy; in other words, “I think he thinks that I think that he 
thinks that…” saw more activation than “I think that he thinks that…” Therefore it seems that the 
more sophisticated the ToM processes being undertaken, the more the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is recruited. Yet despite these few studies, the precise function of all the structures 
implicated in the mentalizing network remains nebulous.  
  
A Novel Paradigm 
While a few studies, discussed above, have used a computational approach to study ToM (Suzuki 
et al., 2012; Nicolle et al., 2012; Yoshida et al., 2010b; Hampton et al., 2008), these studies have 
all relied on competitive or cooperative games, usually borrowed from behavioral economics, to 
study how individuals represent the thought processes of others. These games provide powerful 
incentives for individuals to accurately predict the actions of their opponents or partners, but they 
have the potential to present a variety of confounds associated with earning reward. They also 
are functionally unable to isolate different components of the calculations that enter into ToM – 
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each trial is simply a guess about the end-product in the form of a prediction about the behavior 
of the other individual. For these reasons, among others, this thesis uses a novel task, the 
Mentalizer task, which is designed to eliminate extraneous confounds while providing isolated 
components of ToM which can each in turn be modelled.  
 Past ToM studies have used vignettes to great effect, requiring participants to represent 
the beliefs and intentions of independent third-party individuals (Agents) in order to think about 
the choices the Agents are making (Young et al., 2007; Wimmer & Perner; 1983; Fletcher et al, 
1995; Brunet et al, 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Gallagher et al, 2000; Vogeley et al, 2001; 
Castelli et al, 2000; Hieder & Simmel, 1944). The Mentalizer task used here echoes these studies 
by giving participants the same goal of representing beliefs and intentions in an Agent to predict 
the Agent’s choices, but unlike past research, this task contains many trials as opposed to a single 
vignette, during each of which the participant (the Mentalizer) must make judgments about the 
Agent’s state of mind and receives new information with which to update their representations of 
the Agent’s beliefs and intentions. On each trial, the Mentalizer is explicitly asked about the 
belief and the intent of the Agent, and then what choice the Agent will make (a question which 
should be directly predicted by the answers to the belief and intent questions, thus enabling the 
assessment of internal consistency in Mentalizers). Importantly, it is possible for the Agent to 
have false beliefs, and as the Mentalizer knows the actual state of the world, the Mentalizer is 
capable of recognizing these beliefs as such. This means that the Mentalizer is forced to 
represent these beliefs as separate from the actual state of the world.  It is for this reason that 
false belief has long been the gold standard for ToM research (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
 Therefore the Mentalizer task is a novel social learning task in which belief, intent and 
actual prediction are isolated, enabling them to be computationally modeled separately from one 
another. The implementation of dynamic representations, as well as the fact that the Mentalizers 
must represent varying degrees of uncertainty over time, serves to mimic real life use of ToM 
more accurately than the single vignettes used in previous research. This is crucial, because if 
modeling of ToM is to be useful, the neural behavior of Mentalizers must be as close to what it 
would be in real social situations as possible. However, unlike past attempts at computational 
modeling of ToM, the task does not have a competitive or cooperative element, eliminating any 
confounds that might be associated with earning reward in these situations. Therefore, the 
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Mentalizer task is well suited to better elucidating the mechanisms of ToM in both neurotypical 
and ASD individuals. 
That being said, there are limitations to this paradigm. For instance, while the task is 
structured to be more ecologically valid than previous tasks which relied solely on vignettes 
without implementing learning, it still fails to perfectly mimic the experience of implementing 
ToM in the real world. However, it remains a closer approximation of the nuances of ToM than 
most of the previous literature. The complexity of the task also signifies that it is a challenge to 
ensure that all participants understand it completely before collecting behavioral data. This has 
been addressed by having Mentalizers complete a worksheet designed to assess understanding 
beforehand, but it is still possible that some confusion with the task design remains. 
This thesis is also fairly liberal with its use of broad ToM terms – especially “belief” and 
“intent.” In order to avoid issues surrounding of what exactly constitutes “belief” or “intent,” 
when the task was explained, the use of these words was avoided (see Appendix A for exact 
wording). This was also intended to side step the question of whether or not an individual can 
truly “intend” an action if their knowledge of the state of the world is uncertain. In this thesis, 
these terms are used simply as shorthand to refer to the different questions posed to Mentalizers 
and should not be taken as references to absolute definitions. 
While this thesis is solely concerned with behavioral data and the fit of models to this data, it 
is important to note that the Mentalizer task is fully viable for neuroimaging purposes, and when 
fMRI data is collected of participants, analysis of this data in conjunction with the computational 
models of best fit to the behavioral data will yield information about the specific roles of brain 
structures within the Mentalizing network. As currently little is known about how these 
structures enact ToM this thesis represents an opportunity to better understand how mental 
representations of the thoughts of others are constructed, as well as a chance to investigate how 




CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
All computations were performed in MATLAB (version 2010a & 2014a; Mathworks Inc., 
Natick, MA, USA), and behavioral data was collected using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
1997). (See Author Contributions section for more details on allocation of labor). 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the established database of the Adolphs lab (California 
Institute of Technology). 53 neurotypical (40 male) individuals and 26 ASD (21 male) 
individuals each completed one Charity task (acting as the Agent) and one Mentalizer task 
(acting as the Mentalizer). For participants to be included in the ASD group, they were required 
to be over the age of 18, to be verbal, and to meet the criteria for ASD according to the ADOS 
test (Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Module 4; Lord et al, 2000) as well as the criteria 
for Asperger’s Syndrome or Autism according to the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). All participants also 
possessed a full-scale IQ score (FSIQ) above 85, determined with one of the versions of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale: the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, 1st or 2nd 
edition (Wechsler, 1999, 2011); the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd or revised edition 
(Wechsler, 1981, 1997); or the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd edition (Wechsler, 
1991; 1 participant]). Controls were psychologically and neurologically healthy individuals 
matched to the ASD group on age, gender, years of education, and IQ (Table 1), with no family 
history of ASD. The control group was then split into two groups for model fitting, which were 
balanced across each other in terms of the same metrics, as well as which version of the task they 
performed (old vs new) (Table 1). The purpose behind the splitting was to fit the models on one 
group and then assess to goodness of this fit on the other group in a technique known as cross 
fitting, to avoid concerns associated with double-dipping. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and gave informed consent as 
approved by the California Institute of Technology Institutional Review Board. All participants 
successfully completed the task and were paid $20/hour as well as any bonus money earned over 





Behavioral Data Collection 
The main experimental protocol consists of a task-within-a-task. The inner task (the Charity 
task) takes place over 121 trials during each of which the participant (the Agent) chooses 
whether to give to a charity or to keep money for themselves. However, at any given time the 
program is in one of two modes, which alternate periodically without the knowledge of Agents 
(after the first 21 trials, in which the mode is 
revealed in order to allow the Agent to practice). 
In the normal mode, the Agent’s choices are 
implemented 65% of the time, and reversed 35% 
of the time. In the reversal mode, the Agent’s 
choices are reversed 65% of the time and 
actually happen only 35% of the time. 
Importantly, the current program state switches 
every so often, but is stable enough that the 
Agents had time to learn. In order to get the 
choices they want, Agents must keep track of 
the recent history of reversals versus normal 
outcomes so that they can continously update 
their belief about what state they are in.  
In the outer task (the Mentalizer task)  
participants (Mentalizers) watch an Agent 
perform the Charity task while mentally 
updating representions of the Agent’s beliefs 
and intentions from trial to trial. Because the 
Agent must infer which one of the two possible 
modes is in effect at any given time, whereas the 
Mentalizer is always kept informed about what 
the true mode is, there are opportunities for the 
Mentalizer to represent the agent’s beliefs as 
false. The Mentalizer must take into account 
both the Agent’s current belief about the mode 







mean 30.26 30.46 28.35 
SD 9.14 8.85 8.88 
Years of 
education 
mean 14.89 14.92 14.46 
SD 1.39 1.41 2.14 
Male # 20 20 21 
PIQ 
mean 105.26 105.62 109.65 
SD 10.67 11.28 10.59 
VIQ 
mean 108.11 108.12 105.46 
SD 10.47 9.88 18.77 
FSIQ 
mean 107.52 107.96 107.62 
SD 9.76 10.18 15.14 
AQ 
mean 20.33 24.01 27.25 
SD 16.62 21.68 8.72 
EQ 
mean 48.69 53.42 28.11 
SD 13.03 11.38 9.37 
SQ 
mean 71.15 75.00 67.08 
SD 21.49 25.56 23.3 
EYES 
Score 
mean 27.30 27.68 24.19 
SD 3.57 3.78 4.23 
SNI 
Network 
mean 4.72 4.80 4.36 
SD 1.62 1.89 1.91 
SNI PPL 
mean 19.44 26.00 24.20 
SD 10.26 28.52 31.99 
SNI 
Embed 
mean 2.12 2.12 .168 
SD 1.51 1.94 1.54 
 
Table 1. Participant Demographics. MC1, MC2 = 
Matched Controls groups 1 and 2; ASD = Autism 
Spectrum Disorder.  Shaded cells indicate this measure 




and their hypothesis about the Agent’s intentions when predicting choice for maximum accuracy 
(for instance, it is possible that the Agent thinks that the state is reversal, and so they picked the 
charity intending for the decision to be reversed and for the money to actually go to themselves). 
On each trial before the Agent’s choice is revealed, the Mentalizer is asked to answer 3 
questions: 1) does the Agent intend to donate to the charity or not, 2) what mode does the Agent 
believe to be in effect, and 3) what choice will the Agent make. 
This task structure mimics traditional ToM tasks, ensuring that Mentalizers must represent 
the true and false beliefs of Agents, and integrate their representations of Agent belief with that 
of Agent intent in order to predict the Agent’s actions (Fig. 1, Young et al., 2007). During each 
 
Figure 2. The Mentalizer Task.  a) Schematic of example trial of Mentalizer Task. On each trial participants saw an image 
of the Agent’s face as well as an image representing one of three charities, and answered three questions about the Agent’s 
belief about the current mode, the Agent’s preference towards the charity, and the Agent’s choice whether to donate or keep 
the money, by choosing the corresponding image at the bottom of the screen. An image with a check mark indicated a 
certain answer; and image with a question mark indicated an uncertain response. After answering, an image of a pointing 
hand indicated the actual Agent choice, and then an image of a stack of bills indicated which between the Agent and the 
charity actually received the money. Probe trials were randomly scattered amongst regular trials, during which the 
Mentalizer was asked to report the actual mode. The circular image at the top of the screen indicated the actual mode of the 
trial. b) Example reversal history over 41 sample trials. Each arrow indicates one trial. Red dotted boxes indicate areas likely 
to create a false belief in Agents due to a sharp divergence in the pattern of choice outcomes from the program mode. Over 





trial, the Agent is offered a choice, the Mentalizer is asked about what they think the Agent’s 
beliefs about the program mode and intentions toward the charity are, and then Agent’s actual 
choice and the trial outcome is revealed. The task as a whole consists of either 80 (old version) 
or 84 trials (new version), plus 21 initial practice trials. However, only the first 80 trials were 
used for analysis (excluding practice trials), so the old and new versions of the task are 
functionally equivalent. 33 control participants performed the old version and 20 performed the 
new version, and splitting of matched controls for the purposes of analysis was balanced in terms 
of new/old versions of the task in the two groups. 11 out of 26 ASD participants performed the 
new version.  
In addition to performing the Mentalizer task, all participants completed the “reading the 
mind in the eyes” task (Eyes task; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) as well as a standard IQ test 
yielding a PIQ (performance intelligence quotient; nonverbal intelligence) score and a VIQ 
(verbal intelligence quotient) score, as well as a FSIQ (full scale intelligence quotient) score  
(Table 1). In addition, all participants completed tests for AQ, EQ and SQ (Autism Spectrum 
Quotient, Empathy Quotient, Systemizing Quotient) scores (Wheelwright et al., 2006; 
Goldenfeld et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 2004; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; 2001b). They also were 
scored on the Social Network Index (SNI) for the diversity of their social networks (SNI 
Network), the number of individuals in their networks (SNI PPL) and the number of embedded 
networks (SNI Embed) (Table 1; Cohen et al., 1997). 
On the day of the experiment, participants first completed a consent form, followed by a 
demographics questionnaire and finally a “Day of Visit” screening questionnaire containing 
questions on sleep, drugs or medications taken, and history of psychiatric diagnoses, concussions 
and seizures to assess their state of mind. Participants then received an extensive powerpoint 
briefing to familiarize them with the structure and rules of the Agent task. They next completed a 
quiz with the experimenter comprised of 4 questions to assess comprehension.  For any questions 
that were answered incorrectly, the experimenter went through the logic of the task once more 
with the participant. Participants then completed the Charity task. Following the Charity task, 
participants received a second powerpoint briefing describing the Mentalizer task (for exact 
wording, see Appendix A), and then completed that task, which contained a different set of trials. 
Upon completion of the Mentalizer task, participants filled out a questionnaire in which they 
indicated the preferences of the Agent they were observing for each charity (i.e. donate or take), 
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and then provided information about any strategies they used to learn about the agent. Once this 
was completed, the experimenter randomly selected one trial from the Charity task and one trial 
from the Mentalizer task and, depending on the task, paid the agent the true outcome (Charity 
task) or a reward of 5$ per correct answer (3 possible) and $0.50 for each correct probe trial 
(Mentalizer task). Finally, Participants completed on any of the following surveys if they had not 
done so on a previous visit: AQ, EQ, SNI. 
  
Agent Generation 
Agents presented during the Mentalizer task were generated by combining beliefs from 
real participants on the Charity task with engineered preferences for certain charities. Initial 
novel Agents were brute force generated by creating 10,000 sets of paired modes and outcomes, 
with two set average lengths of mode duration (4 trials and 10 trials) with a range of 3 and 5 
respectively. The total number of trials was set to 84 (28 for each charity). Block (set of 
consecutive trials with the same mode) lengths were randomly generated in such a way that each 
mode was in effect for 42 trials overall. The outcomes of each trial (whether or not the Agent’s 
decision was executed or reversed) were generated by setting the total number of executed trials 
per mode to reflect the mode’s probability (either .65 or .35) as closely as possible over all trials 
with that mode, then randomly distributing those trials within all the blocks with that mode. The 
outcome data was then fitted to a basic model of belief (for more, see the details on the RW 
belief model in Reinforcement Learning Models). This model assumed belief before the first 
outcome was revealed on the first trial to be equally biased towards both modes, with a learning 
rate of 0.3. 
This yielded 10,000 sets of modes, outcomes, and agent beliefs.  The bottom 95% of 
these sets with the least stable agent beliefs (in other words, with the most switching of beliefs 
from one mode to another over the 84 trials) were cast aside. In order to calculate this, agent 
beliefs were treated as binary. Out of the remaining 500 sets, those with agents who possessed 
false beliefs over 30% to 40% of the trials were selected.  These sets were then assigned charity 
information.  For each set, 100 permutations of the order in which the three types of charities 
were presented and the amount of money the agent is offered for themselves ($7-13) were 
randomly generated. In none of these permutations was there more than 2 consecutive repeats of 
the amount the agent was offered or of the charity type, and the exact same trial was never 
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repeated consecutively. The amount of money offered for the charity was kept constant across all 
trials at $10, and the side of the screen on which the charity would be presented was randomly 
assigned for each trial. 
Each of the 100 permutations of charity information for each of the remaining sets were 
then randomly assigned to have agents prefer one charity over themselves 100% of the time and 
vice versa for the other two charities, or to prefer two charities over themselves 100% of the time 
and vice versa for the remaining one. They were then fitted to a model for agent intentions and 
expected outcomes. Since charity preferences were set to either 100% or 0%, for all trials 
involving a specific charity the agent was given the same intent.  The agent’s choice relied on the 
interaction of these intents with the beliefs garnered from the Rescorla-Wagner belief model (on 
the first trial the agent was set to choose randomly). The agent’s expected outcome of each trial 
was a function of what mode the agent believed was in effect and what choice they made. 
Finally, the RW/RW model of a Mentalizer estimating the agent’s beliefs and intents was fitted 
to the agents and permutations in order to select out the most learnable sets. The mean of the 
model’s intent predictions in the 4th quarter of total trials, compared to the agent’s actual intent, 
was used as an indicator of the agent’s “learnability.”  
The top 20 sets with the highest learnability were selected out and pared down by using 
each for the Charity task on pilot subjects. The final 10 Agents selected were those for which 
participants exhibited the greatest accuracy. Due to an algorithmic error, the fact that beliefs are 
collected from Charity task participants after the trial in which they used that belief was not 
corrected for, so the constructed Agents using these beliefs access them one trial ahead of time. 
Although this resulted in Agents who technically possess one trial’s worth of precognition for the 
entire duration of the task, it is unlikely that this drastically affect Mentalizer performance as the 
task already contained much uncertainty to begin with, and the mental states of others are to a 
certain extent stochastic. Furthermore, Mentalizers did not receive explicit feedback during the 
task about their performance on belief. 
 
Models of Learning 
Computational models simulating the updating of belief and intent over time were used to 
investigate the updating process of Mentalizer’s ToM representations of the Agents. These 
models were structured so as to generate values for the signals that will later be investigated in 
26 
 
neuroimaging data – these signs being primarily uncertainty and prediction error. Uncertainty 
here refers to how sure the Mentalizer is of the accuracy of any of their representations of Agent 
belief or intent, and prediction error refers to the difference on each trial between what the 
Mentalizer predicted and what actually happened (in other words, how surprised the Mentalizer 
was by the outcome). Models used a Rescorla-Wagner update rule of reinforcement learning 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) for belief and intent calculations, which was altered in a variety of 
ways to reflect different ways that these values may be computed.  
The belief model focused on the program state aspect of the Mentalizing task – in which 
Mentalizers, watching the Agents, attempt to ascertain what the Agent’s current belief about 
program states is and to use this prediction to inform their interpretations of other information 
about the Agent. To mimic this process, the belief model was designed as a flexible model that 
used prediction error (calculated as the difference between trial outcome at time t (OCt) and 
representation of belief prior to that trial (Bt-1), in essence assuming that the more surprised by an 
outcome the Mentalizer is, the more likely they are to update their representation of belief. This 
model was able to accommodate rapid switches of belief between one program state and another, 
and was fitted to individual data using a learning rate λBel . 
 Basic Belief Model  
Bt = Bt-1 + (λBel)*(OCt – Bt-1) 
 The same mathematical principles were used to represent intent, simply computing 
prediction error for intent and updating the representation of charity preference on each trial 
accordingly.  
Basic Intent Model 
It = It-1 + (λInt)*(OCt – It-1) 
All models had a single parameter to fit (learning rate), whose value was determined by 
minimizing the negative log likelihood generated from the difference between the model’s 
predictions and the actual answers given by the Mentalizer participant. Thus for each set of data 
it was possible to arrive at two optimized learning rates: one for belief and one for intent.  
Ultimately, eight models were selected for analysis: RW/RW, RW/RW_overT, 
RW/REAL_overT, RW/NONE_overT, RW_overT/RW, REAL/REAL_overT, 
normal/NONE_overT and reversal/NONE_overT . RW/RW is the model implementing the basic 
Rescorla-Wagner update rule for both belief and intent described above. RW/RW_overT uses the 
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same basic belief model, but the intent model gives earlier trials more weight than later trials. 
This is achieved by dividing the learning rate by the number of times a given charity has been 
presented. RW/REAL_overT uses the same scaled intent as RW/RW_overT and the same belief 
 
Figure 3. Fitting the RW/RWoverT model to behavioral data. Using a gridsearch method, each participant group was fitted 
to belief and intent learning rates in the 0-1 space (left column, broad gridsearch) at intervals of 0.1. Vertical axis (e) 
represents the negative log likelihood of the model fit to the data, where a higher e indicates a worse fit. The narrow 
gridsearch (right column) examined the learning rate space around the minimum e from the broad gridsearch at intervals of 
0.01 to refine the optimal learning rates. The learning rates at which the minimal e occurred in the narrow gridsearch were 




model, but the belief calculations that go into the intent calculations are not those from the belief 
model, but the real state in effect at any given trial, which the Mentalizer is fully aware of.  
REAL/REAL_overT is nearly identical to this model except that it does not implement a belief 
model at all – instead using the real state for both belief and intent. RW/NONE_overT calculates 
intent without using belief at all – in other words, it takes the choices of Agents at face value 
rather than considering that if the Agent believes reversal mode is in effect, they will pick the 
opposite of what they truly want. Both normal/NONE_overT and reversal/NONE_overT are the 
same as RW/NONE_overT except that instead of using a standard Rescorla-Wagner model for 
belief, they assume that all trials are on normal mode or on reversal mode, respectively. Finally, 
RW_overT/RW uses a basic intent model, but belief is calculated using a scale learning rate, so 
that the later a trial occurs in the task, the less weight it brings to the belief calculation. 
Figure 3 depicts how learning rates were optimized on MC1, MC2, and ASD for the 
RW/RWoverT model as an example. The same process was applied to all the other models as 
well. Optimized belief and intent learning rates were arrived at using a grid search approach 
where first a broad search over the 0-1 belief and intent learning rate space was conducted at 
intervals of 0.1, and then the minimum log likelihood (taken to be the indicator of the model with 
the best fit to the data) was used to conduct a second, narrower gridsearch (intervals of 0.01).  
Negative log likelihood was calculated using the following equation:  




where mentVals represents a matrix of the actual answers of the participant, modVals represents 
the values given by the model, and modDiff is a matrix with one row being model predictions 
and the second row being (1 - model predictions).  
 The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was used as a metric to assess goodness of fit 
of the models. This value is based directly on the negative log likelihood: 
BIC = 2 ∗ (𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑) + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) − log⁡(2𝜋)⁡ 
where numParameters is the number of parameters going into the fitting of the model, and 
numData represents the number of data points being assessed (so in this case the number of trials 
multiplied by the number of questions being asked). 




Behavioral Data Analysis 
The accuracy of an ASD group (N=26) and a control group (N=63) on the Mentalizer task was 
assessed in terms of belief, intent, and choice. These metrics were isolated through analysis of 
answers to three questions asked on every trial:  
1) What program mode, normal or reversal, does the Agent believe to be in 
effect on this trial?  
2) Does the Agent intend the money to go to themselves or to the charity?  
3) Will the Agent choose themselves or the charity? 
Importantly, it was necessary for Mentalizers to integrate their answers for the belief and intent 
questions in order to answer the choice question accurately. For example, a belief in reversal 
mode would indicate that the Agent would ultimately choose the opposite of what they wanted to 
occur, so the Mentalizer would need to flip their choice prediction answer. 
Both control and ASD populations performed well above chance on the belief question but 
not significantly differently from one another (Fig. 4a). Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals 
 
Figure 4. Behavioral Accuracy a) Percent accuracy by group (NCTL=53, NASD=26), computed on a trial-for-trial basis. For 
conditions in which learning was expected to occur across the duration of the experiment (i.e. intent and choice) accuracy is 
shown for the first and last thirty trials (10 from each charity). b) Consistency across trials by group. Trials qualified as 
consistent if the participant’s answer for choice was logically predicted by their answers for belief and intent. Asterisks 
within columns refer to bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals as significantly different from 50% behavioral accuracy 
(values depicted with error bars). Asterisks between columns (within population and question type only) refer to 
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were used to determine significance from chance (50% accuracy) and significance between 
groups.  
Since the mode switches back and forth many times over the course of the task, Mentalizers 
could only rely information from previous trials to a limited extent. Therefore, they were not 
expected to perform better in later trials on belief than in early trials (and on average the data 
echoed this expectation). However, the intent of Agents vis-à-vis the charities remained constant 
throughout the task, and therefore it was possible to build up an understanding of which charities 
the Agents preferred over time and use this information to gradually increase performance on the 
intent and choice questions over the total 80 trials. To determine if this was the case, the intent 
and choice performance were analyzed in two sections: the first 30 trials, where Mentalizers 
were operating on relatively little data, and the last 30 trials, where Mentalizers had at least 50 
trials worth of information on which to base their answers.  
 Performance of the control population on the intent question was significantly different 
between the first 30 trials and the last 30 trials, indicating a net improvement in accuracy on this 
question over time (Fig. 4a). In contrast, the ASD population showed no difference in 
performance between the first 30 trials and the last 30 trials for intent. Accuracies for both the 
first 30 trials and the last 30 trials for controls were also significantly different from chance, 
while for ASD neither value was significantly different from chance. 
In terms of the choice question, neither group showed a significant difference between the 
first 30 trials and the last 30 trials. However, the control group’s accuracies were above chance 
for both instances, whereas the ASD population’s accuracies were at not above chance in either 
instance. 
To assess the degree to which the groups were using a logical policy to perform the 
Mentalizer task, the percentage of trials in which their answers for belief and intent directly 
predicted their answer for choice was quantified as a “consistency” metric (Fig. 4b). For 
example, a trial where a participant answered “reversal” for belief, “charity” for intent, and 
“self” for choice was classified as consistent. The levels of consistency of both control and ASD 
population were between 70-80%, which was significantly different from 50% of trials. 






Eight different computational models were fit to behavioral data from three different participant 
groups – two Matched Control groups (MC1; MC2) and one group with autism (ASD), where N 
= 27, 26, and 26 respectively. The basic model off which all other models were based, RW/RW, 
used a basic Rescorla-Wagner update rule for both belief and intent, each of which had a 
learning rate which could be fitted to individual or group data (for more, see Methods). The best 
performing model on control data was RW/RWoverT, a model that was identical to RW/RW 
except that the intent model learning rate was scaled over the course of trials. This had the effect 
of giving more weight to interpretations of earlier trials and gradually tapering off the ability of 
the model to update as time went on.  
 The other six models were purposely designed to update in a logically suboptimal way, in 
the hopes of capturing possible errors present in Mentalizer calculations. Thus RW_overT/RW 
used a basic intent model but a weighted learning rate for belief, giving more credence to the 
early trials, despite the fact that the mode switched back and forth intermittently, rendering the 
information given in early trials useful for only a limited amount of time.  
Likewise, RW/REAL_overT used the standard belief model for calculating belief, but the 
real mode of the program to calculate intent rather than calculated belief. REAL/REAL_overT 
functioned in the same way except that belief was never modelled in the first place – rather, the 
real mode was used both the answer the belief question and to calculate intent. Similarly, 
RW/NONE_overT used the basic belief model but disregarded the mode entirely for intent 
computations – instead interpreting the choices of Agents as direct indications of their intentions. 
normal/NONE_overT and reversal/NONE_overT functioned along the same lines, except that 
they assumed for belief that the Mentalizer constantly believed it was normal or reversal mode, 
respectively, and used this constant belief to construct intent.  
 Models were fitted to the data to find optimized learning rates, which dictated how much 
weight each update to the models’ predictions would have (in other words, the speed at which 
the model learned). All models were fitted for a belief learning rate and an intent learning rate, 
except for REAL/REAL_overT, normal/NONE_overT, and reversal/NONE_overT which only 
needed an intent learning rate as belief was not learned. Learning rates were optimized via a 
gridsearch method (see Methods, Fig. 3). 
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 Belief learning rates were relatively similar among all groups within each model (Fig. 
5a). RW/RW and RW/RW_overT received identical belief learning rates to each other within 
each group, as did RW/REAL_overT and RW/NONE_overT. For all groups, belief learning rates 
went to 1 for RW_overT/RW. For no model were the belief learning rates significantly different 
between participant groups (bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals). 
 The fitting of optimized intent learning rates showed nearly identical learning rates 
amongst all groups and for all models that were small in magnitude, except for the 
RW/RW_overT model (Fig. 5b). This model showed a striking dissociation between the fits to 
both MC groups and the ASD group, where MC1 and MC2 had intent learning rates of 0.58 and 
0.69, respectively, while the intent learning rate of ASD was 0.09. This model was also the only 
one to achieve any kind of significant dissociation between groups. The intent learning rate of 
 
Figure 5. Fitted learning rates to all models. a) Optimized belief learning rates, computed for each group. The final three 
models, REAL/REAL_overT, normal/NONE_overT, reversal/NONE_overT, are not represented because they rely on the real 
mode, assume constant normal mode, or assume constant reversal mode respectively – therefore using no learning rate. b) 
Optimized intent learning rates, computed for each group. All learning rates optimized using the gridsearch method. Error bars 






MC1 was significantly different from that of ASD, and this was nearly the case between MC2 
and ASD as well (lower bound MC2 = 0.21 and upper bound ASD = 0.22). Significance values 
were determined in the same manner as for belief learning rates, with bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 To explore the degree of accuracy the models achieved in mimicking the answers given 
by Mentalizers, the percent of trials in which the models directly agreed with the Mentalizers in 
terms of belief, intent, and choice were quantified (Fig. 6). In terms of belief, (Fig. 6 top) 
RW/RW, RW/RW_overT, RW/REAL_overT, and RW/NONE_overT showed nearly identical 
accuracies (between 67-72%) for all groups. RW_overT/RW, normal_NONE_overT and 
reversal/NONW_overT were the worst performing models in terms of belief – failing to perform 
significantly above chance (50% accuracy). No models had belief accuracies that were 
significantly different between groups (bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals). 
 Intent accuracies (Fig. 6 bottom left) showed more variation across groups in RW/RW 
and RW/RW_overT, which were more accurate for matched control groups than they were for 
the ASD group. However, RW/RW_overT was the only model where this difference in accuracy 
 
Figure 6. Percent trials in which models agree with Mentalizers. On a trial-by-trial basis, the percentage of trials in which the 
models gave the same answers as the Mentalizers in terms of belief (top), intent (bottom left) and choice (bottom right).  Error 
bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5000 iterations). Dotted lines represent 50% accuracy (chance). 





between both matched control groups and ASD was significantly different. The other models all 
showed intent accuracies that were similar to one another, and where at least one matched 
control group was not significantly different than ASD. For all of these remaining models, 
accuracies were not significantly different from 50% (chance), or below chance, on at least one 
group of matched controls, with the exception of RW_overT/RW which showed higher 
accuracies.  
 Choice accuracy (Fig. 6 bottom right) was poor across the board, at no point rising higher 
than 56% of trials correct. All models and all groups showed accuracies around 50% (chance), 
with the exception of RW/REAL_overT and the MC1 group of RW/NONE_overT, which had 
very low accuracies (32-35% correct). RW/RW and RW/RW_overT were the only models for 
whom both MC1 and MC2 accuracies were significantly above 50% (bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals), while no model took ASD accuracies above 50%. 
 To further investigate the goodness of fit of the models to behavioral data, the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) was examined (Fig. 7). The BIC uses the negative log likelihood as 
well as the number of parameters entering into a model and the number of data points under 
 
Figure 7. Goodness of fit of each model as described by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The more elevated the BIC 
value, the worse fit a model is to a set of data. Combined BIC refers to fit as judged by a sum of belief, intent and choice 
modelling. Belief BIC, Intent, BIC, and Choice BIC refer to the fits on each of these questions individually. Error bars represent 







consideration to calculate how well a model fits to the data, and the lower the BIC value, the 
better the fit.  
 Four different BICs were calculated: a combined BIC value incorporating belief, intent 
and choice model predictions, and separate belief BIC, intent BIC, and choice BIC values to 
assess fits to those specific questions (Fig. 7). For no models were ASD BIC values below the 
BIC value of a random model (dotted line) – and this was true for overall BIC as well as the 
individual BICs for belief, intent, and choice.  
Combined BICs were lowest for all participant groups for RW/RW, RW/RW_overT, 
RW/REAL_overT, and RW/NONE_overT (Fig. 7 top left) and were significantly below the BIC 
value for a random model for MC1 and MC2 (bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals). Notably, 
RW/RW and RW/RW_overT both showed markedly lower combined BIC values for both 
matched control groups than for ASD (although this did not achieve significance), whereas all 
other models showed no major differences between groups. The same pattern was true for the 
first four models with regards to the belief BIC values (Fig. 7 top right). These first four models 
also had drastically lower belief BIC values than the second four models.  
 RW/RW and RW/RW_overT stood out with regards to the intent BICs as the only two 
models with any difference between participant groups (Fig. 7 bottom left), although this 
difference was not significant (bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals). While ASD showed 
BICs as high as any other model (significantly above the random model BIC value), both 
matched control groups on these models showed lower values.  
 Choice BICs, in contrast, showed very little difference between models and little to no 
difference between groups. Only the last three models, which did not fit a belief learning rate, 
showed across the board slightly lower values. 
In general, in terms of comparing BIC values, the models were best able to fit belief, 




The generalizability of the optimized models was tested by assessing the fit of these models 
across groups (Fig. 8). More specifically, the learning rates found by fitting the models to the 
MC1 group were tested on the MC2 group and vice versa. The percent accuracies and BIC 
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values from these two tests were averaged together to yield measures of how well the models 
generalized across different groups of neurotypical (control) individuals. Similarly, the MC1 and 
MC2 learning rates were tested on the ASD group, and these two sets of values were averaged 
together to yield a measure of how well the ASD behavioral data could be described by models 
using control learning rates. 
 The overall BIC values for the models cross fit across MC groups (Fig. 8a, white bars) 
were only significantly below the random model BIC value for RW/RW and RW/RW_overT 
(bootstrapping 95% confidence intervals). The BIC values for the ASD data fit with MC (Fig. 8a, 
gray bars) were significantly higher than the random model BIC value for all models. 
 The accuracies of the cross fit models were also assessed (Fig. 8b). For the models cross 
fit across MC groups, the first four models performed identically well in terms of belief, and the 
 
Figure 8. Cross-Fitting of optimized learning rates. a) Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) assessing overall goodness of fit of 
models (combining belief, intent, and choice predictions). White bars represent average overall BIC when MC1 was fit with 
MC2 learning rates and vice vera. Gray bars represent average overall BIC when ASD was fit with MC1 and MC2 learning 
rates. Dotted line represents BIC values for a random model. b) Percent accuracies of cross-fit models. LEFT: average belief, 
intent and choice percent accuracies across models when MC1 and MC2 groups were fit to each other’s learning rates. RIGHT: 
average belief, intent and choice percent accuracies across models when the ASD group was fit to MC1 and MC2 learning rates.  
Dotted lines represent 50% accuracy (chance). Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5000 iterations). 






RW/RW and RW/RW_overT also performed well in terms of intent and above chance in terms 
of choice. All other models had at least one metric perform at chance or worse. 
 For the models with ASD data fit to MC learning rates, the same pattern of accuracies is 
evident. For the RW/RW model and the RW/RW_overT model, the ASD cross fit had 
significantly lower accuracies for belief, intent and choice than the MC cross fit (bootstrapping 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Correlations 
In order to examine the relationship between performance on the Mentalizer task and a variety of 
other traits and behavioral measures, correlations between these values were assessed for 
matched controls and for ASD using Pearson’s rho values (Tables 2 and 3).  




SNI PPL SNI 
Embed 
EQ SQ 
FSIQ 0.8517 0.8307 0.3576 0.0172 0.0855 0.1768 0.1456 -0.0823 
PIQ  0.4403 0.3737 -0..0616 0.0633 0.0756 0.0723 -0.0597 
VIQ   0.2170 0.1188 0.1211 0.2761 0.1304 -0.1066 
EYES Score    -0.1891 -0.0334 -0.1459 0.4339 -0.1429 
SNI Network     0.7152 0.7096 0.1205 0.0809 
SNI PPL      0.8527 0.2401 0.2168 
SNI Embed       0.1501 0.1897 
EQ        0.4560 
    OVERALL CHANGE 
 AQ Age Male Belief Consistency Intent Choice Consistency 
FSIQ 0.0006 -0.0422 0.1440 0.1796 0.1981 0.3345 0.2734 0.0451 
PIQ 0.1260 -0.0091 0.2444 0.0396 0.0865 0.3294 0.1600 0.1317 
VIQ -0.1270 -0.0583 0.0154 0.2528 0.2934 0.2338 0.2926 -0.0705 
EYES Score -0.1460 -0.1614 -0.1066 0.2659 0.2141 -0.0962 -0.1833 -0.1313 
SNI Network 0.1688 0.1392 -0.0296 0.0384 0.2899 0.2590 0.1953 0.0360 
SNI PPL 0.0298 0.1135 -0.0486 -0.0507 0.0803 0.0942 0.0246 -0.0272 
SNI Embed 0.1497 0.2033 -0.0653 0.0594 0.1278 0.2178 0.0542 -0.0627 
EQ -0.3724 -0.1019 -0.0735 0.3427 0.2123 0.0264 -0.0908 -0.2570 
SQ -0.0534 0.0064 0.1371 0.0609 0.1567 -0.1245 0.1737 -0.1828 
AQ  0.4058 0.1719 -0.0772 -0.1100 -0.0592 -0.0815 0.2812 
Age   0.0778 -0.1933 -0.2221 -0.1282 -0.2403 0.0137 
Male    -0.1235 -0.0857 -0.0306 0.2225 0.1075 
OVERALL         
Belief     0.1544 0.4275 0.0719 -0.1637 
Consistency      0.144 0.377 0.2463 
CHANGE         
Intent       0.3113 0.0049 
Choice        0.0725 
Table 2. Control group correlations in terms of Pearson’s rho values. FSIQ, PIQ, EYES Score, SNI Network, SNI PPL, EQ, 
SQ, and AQ represent behavioral metrics as described in Methods. OVERALL belief/consistency represents these measures 
over all trials in the Mentalizer task. CHANGE intent/choice/consistency represents the magnitude of the difference of these 
measures between the first 30 trials and the last 30 trials. Green shading indicates p-values < 0.01; yellow = indicates p-
values < 0.05. 
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 Control subjects (Table 2) showed unsurprisingly strong positive correlations between 
FSIQ and PIQ, FSIQ and VIQ, and PIQ and VIQ. There was also a strong correlation between 
PIQ and the EYES Score, as well as a correlation between FSIQ and the EYES Score. Similarly, 
there were strong correlations between SNI Network and SNI PPL, SNI Network and SNI 
Embed, and SNI PPL and SNI Embed. Additionally there was a strong correlation between the 
EYES Score and EQ as well as EQ and SQ, and a strong negative correlation between EQ and 
AQ. Age exhibited a strong positive correlation with AQ. Gender was not correlated with 
anything. 
 Overall belief performance of control Mentalizers was correlated with EQ, but not 
strongly. The same was true for overall consistency and VIQ, and overall consistency and SNI 
Network. The change in intent (signifying difference in intent question accuracy from the first 30 
trials and from the last 30 trials and thus functioning as a marker of learning) was weakly 




SNI PPL SNI 
Embed 
EQ SQ 
FSIQ 0.7702 0.9050 0.8052 -0.0249 -0.1114 -0.0101 -0.3460 0.1098 
PIQ  0.4891 0.5496 -0.0430 -0.0452 0.1016 -0.1757 0.0577 
VIQ   0.8035 0.0938 -0.1075 0.0165 -0.3098 0.1355 
EYES Score    0.1826 0.0458 0.1596 -0.3060 -0.0736 
SNI Network     0.6534 0.6744 0.3830 0.1806 
SNI PPL      0.8450 0.3497 0.3414 
SNI Embed       0.1546 0.3607 
EQ        0.0761 
    OVERALL CHANGE 
 AQ Age Male Belief Consistency Intent Choice Consistency 
FSIQ 0.1021 0.2440 -0.2761 0.2256 0.0932 -0.0976 -0.3245 -0.0496 
PIQ -0.0775 0.1461 -0.0541 0.1159 0.1127 -0.1726 -0.1384 0.1107 
VIQ 0.1079 0.2289 -0.3151 0.2787 0.0619 -0.0455 -0.4572 -0.0944 
EYES Score -0.1235 0.1046 -0.2114 0.3667 0.2460 0.1100 -0.2721 0.0321 
SNI Network -0.1911 -0.2198 -0.0326 0.0637 -0.4232 0.2945 0.0228 0.0348 
SNI PPL -0.0923 -0.3075 -0.2165 -0.1933 -0.2345 0.1251 -0.0545 -0.1422 
SNI Embed -0.1322 -0.1178 -0.2361 0.0677 -0.2215 0.0387 -0.2279 -0.1145 
EQ -0.2013 -0.4130 0.2025 -0.5251 -0.2456 -0.0143 0.3230 0.2969 
SQ 0.3928 0.3240 -0.1572 0.0043 -0.3615 -0.1998 -0.2579 -0.1766 
AQ  0.0252 -0.1549 -0.0912 -0.2430 -0.2299 -0.1399 -0.0914 
Age   -0.0320 0.0812 -0.0735 -0.1898 0.0988 -0.2021 
Male    -0.2105 0.1133 -0.1122 0.2387 0.1146 
OVERALL         
Belief     -0.1379 0.3073 -0.3368 -0.0275 
Consistency      -0.2002 -0.0253 0.2785 
CHANGE         
Intent       0.1628 0.1595 
Choice        0.2155 
Table 3. ASD group correlations in terms of Pearson’s rho values. FSIQ, PIQ, EYES Score, SNI Network, SNI PPL, EQ, 
SQ, and AQ represent behavioral metrics as described in Methods. OVERALL belief/consistency represents these measures 
over all trials in the Mentalizer task. CHANGE intent/choice/consistency represents the magnitude of the difference of these 
measures between the first 30 trials and the last 30 trials. Green shading indicates p-values < 0.01; yellow = indicates p-




correlated with FSIQ, and strongly correlated with PIQ and overall belief performance. Change 
in choice was similarly weakly correlated with both FSIQ, VIQ, and change in intent, as well as 
strongly correlated with overall consistency. Change in consistency was not correlated 
significantly with anything. 
 The ASD group (Table 3) showed many similar patterns. For instance, there were strong 
correlations between FSIQ and PIQ and FSIQ and VIQ, with a weak correlation between PIQ 
and VIQ. The EYES Score was strongly correlated with FSIQ, PIQ, and VIQ. SNI Network was 
strongly correlated with SNI PPL, as were SNI Network and SNI Embed, and SNI PPL and SNI 
Embed. SQ and AQ were weakly correlated, and age and SQ had a weak negative correlation. 
Gender again exhibited no significant correlations with anything. 
 For ASD, there was a strong negative correlation between EQ and overall belief 
performance, and a weak correlation between SNI Network and overall consistency. Change in 
intent and change in consistency were not correlated with anything, but change in choice was 






Performance of two participant groups, matched controls and ASD, was assessed on the 
Mentalizer task via accuracies on answering three questions about third-party Agents: belief, 
intent, and choice.  Analysis of these accuracies showed that the performance of control and 
ASD groups were not significantly different from one another on belief (Fig. 4a). However, an 
examination of intent performance by accuracy in the first 30 trials and last 30 trials showed that 
control participants exhibit a significant improvement in performance over the course of the task, 
whereas ASD participants do not. Furthermore, controls perform above chance in both instances 
while individuals with ASD are never significantly above chance. This indicates that individuals 
with ASD have some impairment performing the calculations necessary to answer the intent 
question that does not prevent them from computing belief accurately. 
 It is likely that an individual who is performing the Mentalizer task begins each trial with 
two priors: the belief that the Agent has about the mode and the intention that the Agent has 
towards the relevant charity (Fig. 9). Based on these priors, the Mentalizer makes a prediction 
about what choice the Agent will make on that trial. The Mentalizer then sees the outcome of the 
trial, which can be filtered into two bits of information: whether or not the decision that the 
Agent made was reversed or not, and whether the Agent chose to donate or take money. 
Following principles of reinforcement 
learning, the more surprising this outcome 
was (in other words the more it deviated 
from the priors), the more significant the 
update to the priors will be. However, in 
terms of intent, the choice outcome 
information must be filtered through the 
existing representation of belief in order 
for it to account for the possibility of 
reversal mode being in effect. 
Once the current belief has been 
accounted for, the prediction error 
resulting from the outcome can then go 
 
Figure 9. The Mentalizer task updating process. Prior beliefs and 
intents go to forming a prediction of choice. The Decision Outcome 
and the Choice Outcome of the trial then go to updating these priors. 
Intent must be updated by filtering choice through the current 
representation of belief in order to account for the possibility of the 






towards updating the intent prior, which paired with the belief prior can be used to make the 
prediction about the Agent’s choice on the next trial. 
 The behavioral results found here suggest that there is some issue with the updating of 
the intent prior that ASD individuals are not able to do. Whether they simply fail to update the 
prior, or do so with a sub-optimal calculation is still an unanswered question. However, it is 
unlikely that the lower performance for the intent question can be simply ascribed to the 
cognitive load placed on working memory in this task. It has been shown that individuals with 
ASD have unimpaired verbal working memory using a standard N-back letter task (Williams et 
al, 2005), which requires a very similar cognitive load to the one required to store preferences of 
Agents for different charities. Therefore it seems that the social component of the task is what 
creates the dissociation in behavioral performance between controls and ASD. 
 It may also be that individuals with ASD have difficulty integrating their intent and belief 
priors into a choice prediction. However, this study finds no evidence for this as it is possible 
that the fact that choice performance is never statistically different from chance for ASD (unlike 
controls) is due to their impairments with intent. Since a correct intent calculation is necessary 
for a correct choice prediction, a failure to calculate intent correctly could be entirely responsible 
for never answering the choice question correctly. Furthermore, the high percentage of consistent 
trials in the ASD group, which is not significantly different from the percentage of consistent 
trials in the control group, indicates that individuals with ASD are able to integrate their belief 
and intent priors in a consistent way to give a logical (if incorrect) answer for choice on a regular 
basis (Fig. 4b). 
 This finding supports a more nuanced understanding of how ToM is represented in 
individuals with ASD. While the link between ASD and impaired ToM has been established 
(Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Yoshida et al, 2010b; Moran et al, 2011; Sigman et al, 2006; 
Baron-Cohen et al, 1997a, 1997b; 1985; Adolphs et al, 2001; Leslie, 1987), there has been little 
research to date investigating the exact nature of this impairment. The behavioral data suggests 
that not all components of ToM are equally affected – rather, the type of ToM that governs 
“intent” in this paradigm appears to be dissociable from the type of ToM that governs “belief.” 
The challenge now is to determine how these labels can be generalized to other ToM tasks and 
ultimately to representation of others in the outside world. 
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 Additionally, the high percentage of consistent trials in both groups (Fig. 4b) suggests 
that these populations are using the internally consistent model described in Figure 9, and that 
any systemic errors are due to problems updating priors in an appropriate way when a surprising 
outcome occurs. In other words, the logic behind using belief and intent to update choice is 
present in all groups, so the error must lie in the representations of belief or intent or choice if 
there is low accuracy in answering those respective questions. The presence of this internally 
consistent model suggests that this task is a viable one for the purposes of applying the 
computational approach in order to unearth what type of updating of priors is occurring. 
While it is possible that the differences the task is measuring that are evident both 
behaviorally and in the modelling are due to some other factor than ASD, the results of the 
correlation tests (Table 2, 3) suggest that this is not the case. Most of the correlations found were 
expected because the tests are known to be linked (for example, the positive correlations between 
VSIQ, PIQ and VIQ). For Matched Controls, weak positive correlations (0.01 < p < 0.05) were 
found between intent change over time, choice change over time, and FSIQ, as well as between 
choice change over time and VIQ. A strong positive correlation (p<0.01) was found between 
intent change over time and PIQ (Table 2). However none of these correlations were found in the 
ASD population, and in fact there was found a weak negative correlation between choice change 
over time and VIQ (Table 3). Thus it is likely that differences between MC and ASD learning 
over time cannot be ascribed to these factors. In fact, there was no correlation between some 
behavioral metric and some other test that was in the same direction for both ASD and MC and 
significant. 
 
Implications of Modeling Results 
Eight models were fit to behavioral data in order to investigate the computational processes 
underlying ToM learning in controls and in ASD. Two of these models were designed to provide 
accurate answers: RW/RW, which uses a basic Rescorla-Wagner update rule for both belief and 
intent representations, and RW/RW_overT, which uses the same belief model but weights the 
intent learning rate so that more importance is assigned to updates occurring earlier on in the 
task. The other six models were designed with logical flaws in the hopes of determining what 
impairment might be causing lower intent accuracy in ASD (Fig. 4a). 
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 The group of matched controls (N = 53) was split into MC1 (N = 27) and MC2 (N = 26) 
in order to allow for cross fitting to occur and to avoid double-dipping into the data when 
examining goodness of fit. 
 Although for all the models belief learning rates were relatively similar between groups, 
there was some variation across models (Fig. 5a) – most notably, all belief learning rates were 
under 0.8 except for RW_overT/RW, where every group had a learning rate of 1. This model’s 
logical flaw (weighting earlier updates of belief more than later ones, when in fact the mode 
switches constantly so there is no benefit to this) is most alleviated when the learning rate is 
highest because it raises the degree to which any updating can occur, so it makes sense that if all 
groups are able to predict belief with a relatively high level of accuracy (Fig. 4a), the belief 
learning rate here would go to 1. Since behavior accuracies across groups were not significantly 
different (Fig. 4a), the fact that belief learning rates across groups are not significantly different 
is to be expected.  
 The fitted intent learning rates were also remarkably similar across all groups and 
models, and were all values under 0.3, except for one model: RW/RW_overT. This model shows 
a clear dissociation where the matched control groups have a higher learning rate than the ASD 
group. This means the degree to which this model updates intent is much faster for the fit to 
MC1 and MC2 than it is for the fit to ASD data. This model is one with some of the best 
accuracies for matched controls on all metrics as well as some of the lowest BIC values for 
matched controls (neck-and-neck with the RW/RW model) (Fig. 6-7). The dissociations this 
model shows in learning rates, accuracies, and BIC values in comparing both matched control 
groups with the ASD group indicates that this model is most likely the best suited to unraveling 
the difference in calculations occurring between the two. 
 In terms of accuracy of all models (Fig. 6), it is notable that all models predict belief 
answers relatively equally across groups. Since there is no significant difference between 
matched control and ASD accuracies on the belief question (Fig. 4a), this is to be expected. 
However, there is more variation in intent accuracies. While no model predicts ASD behavior 
better than behavior of both matched control groups, the two models without logical flaws 
(RW/RW and RW/RW_overT) are the ones which most markedly predict matched control 
behavior better than ASD behavior, suggesting that they may be closer to approximating 
neurotypical calculations of ToM than ASD calculations of ToM.  
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 No model excels at predicting choice (Fig. 6), which may perhaps be attributed to the fact 
that although consistency is high in both groups behaviorally (Fig. 4b), there still remained 
around 30% of trials which were not consistent, and the task of predicting choice which relies on 
integrating two separate models correctly may be too challenging for the simple models used 
here. Interestingly, RW/REAL_overT seems to have fit to nearly an inverse model of behavior, 
achieving an accuracy for choice that does not rise about 35% for any group. However it is worth 
mentioning that MC1 and MC2 were the only two groups to have model choice accuracy 
significantly above 50%, which occurred for both RW/RW and RW/RW_overT, whereas no 
model was able to reach choice accuracy significantly above chance for ASD.   
 Model accuracies are for the most part mirrored in the pattern of their BIC values (Fig. 
7). Clearly RW/RW and RW/RW_overT have the best fits to the matched control data overall 
(Fig. 7 top left), while ASD fits overall is equally poor across the first four models and all groups 
have highly elevated BIC values indicating poor fits on the last four models. Breaking down the 
BIC values by belief, intent, and choice also echoes the story told by the accuracies of the model 
in Figure 6. The first four models reliably predict match controls better than ASD but predict all 
groups significantly better than the last four models. In terms of intent, the first two models show 
the same dissociation between matched controls and ASD, while all the other models seem to fit 
equally poorly. 
 For choice, no model has BIC values that are particularly low, but the last three models, 
REAL/REAL_overT, normal/NONE_overT, and reversal/NONE_overT have lower BIC values 
that are lower than the previous five. This is most likely due to the fact that BIC values take the 
number of parameters fit to the model into account. The more parameters, the higher the value – 
a feature intended to discourage model-hacking, or the overfitting of models to data with many 
parameters, which sacrifices generalizability beyond a specific training set. Thus the last three 
models, which only fit an intent learning rate and no belief learning rate, have a slight advantage 
in this regard. 
 The fact that the RW/RW and RW/RW_overT models, which are the best performing for 
matched controls on all metrics, only have one parameter to fit for belief and one parameter to fit 
for intent renders the possibility that the accuracies are due to model-hacking unlikely. It seems 
that RW/RW_overT in particular is able represent a calculation that occurs in neurotypical 
individuals when performing the task, which does not occur or occurs erroneously in ASD, since 
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it is the only model that exhibits a significant difference in percent behavioral accuracy between 
MC groups and ASD. Interestingly, it appears than no model stands out as a good fit for ASD in 
particular – even amongst the ones with have purposeful logical flaws. It is possible that there 
does exist a single model that would capture ASD behavior like RW/RW_overT does for 
neurotypical behavior, and that it simply wasn’t among the ones considered here. However, it is 
also possible that ASD behavior is not homogenous enough to be represented by one model, fit 
to the data as a group. If individuals with ASD differ enough in the ways that they calculate ToM 
to answer the intent question, it is plausible that no one model would be able to capture all of that 
variation. 
 Another concern that may be raised is the coding error resulting in Agents having one 
trial of precognition in terms of viewing the pattern of trial reversals or executions for building 
their models of belief (for more, see Agent Generation in Methods). However, no participants 
mentioned noticing this irregularity, and it is likely that this discrepancy had a small enough 
impact as Mentalizers did not receive explicit feedback on their performance during the task. 
Furthermore, the fact that the dissociations between MC and ASD still occurred despite this 
suggests that it is possible to perform well on this task as a neurotypical individual even with this 
error. However, the error has been rectified in more recent versions of the task and is not present 
in the version that will be used for neuroimaging. 
 
Neural Correlates of Theory of Mind 
While the information the computational models and the behavioral data provide gives more 
details as to how neurotypical individuals might go about computing ToM, mathematically 
speaking, and where individuals with ASD have an impairment in doing so, neuroimaging 
techniques have the potential to link these behavioral findings with the “mentalizing system” of 
neural structures that has already been outlined in previous work (van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009; Rushworth et al, 2013; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Sallet et al, 2012; Hampton et al, 2008; 
Rilling et al, 2004; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2001). Because representing belief switches back 
and forth of the course of the experiment and representing intent is a process which builds slowly 
with the addition of more information with minimal switching, these signals are in a manner of 
speaking orthogonal to each other – in other words, it may be possible to isolate neural activation 
corresponding to belief or intent from each other. 
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 The Mentalizer task has already been optimized for fMRI data collection, and it is 
anticipated that data will be for the most part collected by mid-June 2016 (target: 50 controls; 30 
ASD).When examining this neuroimaging data, we may find activation in the medial prefrontal 
cortex and temporo-parietal junction as those are areas that have been directly implicated in ToM 
computations (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), although it is possible to think about others while 
avoiding explicitly recognizing their internal state, leading to alternate activation patterns. A few 
other locations are also potential candidates. The amygdala and temporal pole are known to 
mediate learning affective traits, so it is possible that activity there will correlate with intent 
computations, as learning what charity an Agent prefers is a type of affective trait (Todorov & 
Olson, 2008). Additionally, the posterior cingulate cortex and amygdala are known to be 
involved in forming first impressions of others (Schiller et al, 2009) and the prefrontal cortex and 
superior temporal sulcus in updating those impressions (Mende-Siedlecki et al, 2013), so it is 
highly probable we will see activity in those locations.  
It is also likely that activity for ASD will be different than controls, especially for intent. It is 
my hypothesis that this activity will be highly heterogeneous within the ASD group, due to the 
fact that no one model was found that fit well to all ASD data – instead, it appeared to be the 
case that each ASD subject was performing computations in their own way, different from the 
others. The uniting factor is that these intent computations were all impaired in comparison to 
controls, but it seems that ASD individuals may all be taking different routes to arrive at the 
same destination, and thus there may be widely diverging patterns of activation among them. 
 
Future Directions 
In the immediate future, this task will be run using fMRI to image activation of neurotypical and 
ASD neural structures during the task. This may yield clues about the source of the dissociation 
in behavior between these two populations on the intent question of the Mentalizer task. As it 
appears that the RW/RW_overT model best captures the differences between MC and ASD 
behavior on the Mentalizer task, this model in particular will be used when examining the 
patterns of neural activation occurring while participants perform the task. Hopefully it will be 
possible to isolate certain components of the mentalizing network which perform specific 
mathematical roles, by correlating their activation with the calculations in the model. It will also 
be useful to investigate how activation differs between ASD and MC – and how these 
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differences may be modulated by which question they are answering. This may provide clues as 
where the differences in calculations are occurring between the two groups, even if the signals 
are too weak to be paired with the models for analysis. 
Another approach will be to try to isolate subgroups within the ASD population by fitting 
the models to individuals rather than group data. If some individuals fit particularly well to 
certain models, then it may be that this model represents a subgroup within the broader label of 
ASD. For this, a larger population of ASD participants would be ideal to achieve maximum 
statistical validity.  
 It will also be useful to try to duplicate these results on a slightly different task. While it 
is clear that the ASD group performs differently when answering questions about belief or intent, 
it is still unclear what larger difference this dissociation is a reflection of. Finding another similar 
task where this dissociation is evident would be a good method of generalizing these findings 
further. Belief and intent are well defined in terms of this paradigm, but it will take further study 
to better understand what the differences in performance truly reflect. It may be that intent 
simply refers to the ability to understand the preferences and the likes or dislikes of another 
individual and this impairment is simply one of the many symptoms of ASD but cannot be 
generalized further. Alternatively, it may be that lowered intent performance is reflective of a 
larger impairment that is captured in this task, which can also be uncovered in other tasks that 
require similar but non-identical calculations. Therefore it will be important to investigate the 
“components” of ToM from as many perspectives as possible before making sweeping 
statements about the nature of how ASD individuals are impaired in representing the mental 




This project was a joint effort between Damian Stanley of the Adolphs lab at Caltech and me. 
Dr. Stanley designed the task and ran behavioral subjects. I wrote the code to generate trials for 
the Charity and Mentalizer tasks, and ran pilot participants on the Charity task. I constructed 
Agents for the Mentalizer task using this data and code that I wrote. Dr. Stanley wrote the 
original code for the RW/RW model, which I heavily adapted to optimize it, assess fits, and to 
build all the other models. I also optimized the behavioral paradigm in Pyschtoolbox to be viable 
for neuroimaging using fMRI, and I piloted participants on this paradigm. I also wrote code to 
assess behavioral and modeling accuracies, as well as the code to assess bootstrapping (which 
was performed by Dr. Stanley) and other statistical fits. I also wrote the code to conduct and 
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APPENDIX A – Mentalizer Stimulus Presentation Instructions 
 
After the participant completed the Agent Charity Task, the experimenter reviewed the 
instructions to the Mentalizer Task. Similar to the Charity Task instructions, the instructions for 
the Mentalizer task are explained via a PowerPoint presentation. The experimenter rea each slide 
aloud to the participant. 
The instructions on the slides are listed as follows: 
1. In this second task, you will be watching some other people make the same decisions that 
you just did.  We want you to try to learn what mode they think the program is in (‘Normal’ 
or ‘Reversal’).  We will show you the actual mode the program is in, but remember that they 
don’t have that information and are guessing – just like you did in the last task.  
2. We would also like you to try to learn what type of person they are (for example which 
charities do they want to donate to and when do they want take the money for themselves).  
Remember – if they believe the program is in ‘Reversal’ mode, they will reverse their 
choices to get what they want. 
3. On each trial, you will first answer 2 questions in random order: 
“Which outcome does Jane want?” 
Press “1” for Definitely Jane 
Press “2” for Maybe Jane 
Press “9” for Maybe Charity 
Press “0” for Definitely Charity 
4. “What does Jane think is the mode now?” 
Press “1” for Definitely ‘Normal’ 
Press “2” for Maybe ‘Normal’ 
Press “9” for Maybe ‘Reversal’ 
Press “0” for Definitely ‘Reversal’ 
5. You will then guess whether you think they chose the charity or themselves. 
 
6. Next you will see what they actually chose. 
7. You will be notified when the mode has changed to either “Normal” or “Reversal”. 
Remember that they do not know that the mode has changed, only you do. 
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8. Go through the next trial with the experimenter to make sure that everything is clear and 
answer any questions you have. 
9. To make sure that you are keeping the actual mode (‘Normal’ or ‘Reversal’) in mind, every 
once and a while there will be a test trial like this one. 
10. When you see this test trial, indicate the current mode.  For every test trial that you respond 
correctly on, you will get an extra $0.50.  In addition, at the end of the experiment, we will 
randomly select one regular trial and you will receive $5 for each of the three questions that 
you answered correctly. 
So it pays to be right! 
11. REMEMBER: 
The person you’re watching does not know what the actual mode is, only you do.  Your goal 
is to figure out what they think the mode is, as well as what their preferences are. 




APPENDIX B – Code for Computational Models 
 
The function belief_and_intent_current_models is the main function called to run 
a set of data (either a group or an individual set of trials) on a given model. It takes X which is a 
vector containing the belief and intent learning rates, dataVals which is a structure containing 
all the behavioral data, modelType which is a scalar indicating the model to run the data on, 
totalSubj which is a scalar indicating the total number of participants in dataVals, and 
initValMat which is a vector of the starting values for belief and intent models.  
It returns e which is the negative log likelihood of the model fit to the data, BIC which is a 
matrix containing [overall BIC, belief BIC, intent BIC, choice BIC] for each individual 
participant, and dataCell which is a structure containing all of the original behavioral data as 
well as model accuracies and other values computed in the function. 
 
function [e,BIC,dataCell]=belief_and_intent_current_models(X,dataVals, 
modelType, totalSubj, initValMat); 
 
%X contains learning rates 
% belEst = Mentalizers' belief estimates [numTrials x numSubjs] normal=1, 
reversal=0 
% belOut = choice execution outcomes [numTrials X numSubjs] executed=1, 
reversed=0 
% intEst = Mentalizers' predictions about agent intent [numTrials X numSubjs] 
donate=1, take=0 
% ag_choice = agents' choices [numTrials X numSubjs] donate=1, take=0 
% chType = charity type (number) [numTrials X numSubjs] 1 or 2 or 3 
% ment_choice = mentalizer's prediction of choice [numTrials X numSubjs] 1 = 
charity, 0 = self 
% ag_belief = agent's belief about mode [numTrials X numSubjs] 1 =normal, 0 = 
reversal 
% ag_intent = if agent wanted to give to charity or self [numTrials X 
numSubjs] 1 = charity, 0 = self 
% initValMat = starting value for models - .5 for now. 
% ment_bel_unbinarized = unbinarized versions (1-4) of belief estimates by 
mentalizers 
% ment_belUncertainty = 1 if mentalizer was certain, 0 if not 
  













    case {1,2,3,4,5} 
        numParameters = 2; 
    case {6,7,8} 
        numParameters = 1; 
end 
 




    sm = 1; 
else 




%begin for loop iterating over trials 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
for knd = 1:numel(dataVals)  %get matrix of values out of structure 
    belOut = dataVals{knd}.bel_oc(1:80,:); 
    chType = dataVals{knd}.char_type(1:80,:); 
    ag_belief = dataVals{knd}.ag_belief(1:79,:); 
    belEst = dataVals{knd}.bel_est(1:80,:); 
    intEst = dataVals{knd}.int_est(1:80,:); 
    ag_choice = dataVals{knd}.ag_choice(1:80,:); 
    ment_choice=dataVals{knd}.ment_choice(1:80,:); 
    ag_intent=dataVals{knd}.ag_intent(1:80,:); 
    state=dataVals{knd}.state(1:80,:); 
     
    clear belMod intMod_ch chVals vals2 vals1 vals; 
    numTrials=size(belEst,1); 
    numSubj=size(belEst,2); 
    dataCell{knd}.bel_lr=X(1); 
    dataCell{knd}.int_lr=X(2); 
    dataCell{knd}.sm=sm; 
     
    %limit bel_lr to under 1 
    if(any(X<0 | bel_lr >1)); 
        e=10000000; 
        return; 
    end 
    if nargin<5 
        initValMat=0.5; %default start value for belief and intent 
    end 
     
    % % Model Belief 
    belMod=nan(numTrials+1,numSubj); 
    belMod(1,:)=initValMat; 
    switch modelType 
        case {1,2,3,4} 
            for ind=2:size(belMod,1) 
                belMod(ind,:)=belMod(ind-1,:)+bel_lr.*(belOut(ind-1,:)-
belMod(ind-1,:)); 
            end 
        case {5} %rwoverT/rw 
            for ind=2:size(belMod,1) 
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                belMod(ind,:)=belMod(ind-1,:)+(bel_lr/(ind-1)).*(belOut(ind-
1,:)-belMod(ind-1,:)); 
            end 
        case {6} 
            for ind = 1:size(belMod,1)-1 
                belMod(ind,:) = state(ind,:); 
            end 
            belMod(size(belMod,1),:) = state((size(belMod,1)-1),:); 
        case {7} 
            belMod(:,:) = 0; %assume normal 
        case {8} 
            belMod(:,:) = 0; %assume reversal 
    end 
    dataCell{knd}.belMod=belMod; %not binary 
     
    %Model Intent 
    numChar=numel(unique(chType(:))); %charities are labeled 1,2 and 3 
    intMod_ch=nan(size(intEst,1)+1,size(intEst,2), numChar); %initial 
separate trackers for charity and agent preferences 
    intMod_ch(1,:,:)=initValMat; %inital values for charity beliefs 
    for ind = 2:size(intMod_ch, 1) %for 2 to number of trials 
        intMod_ch(ind,:,:) = intMod_ch(ind-1,:,:); % copy the previous 
charity slice into the current slice 
        int_ind = sub2ind(size(intMod_ch), ind*ones(numSubj, 1), 
[1:numSubj]', chType(ind-1,:)'); %indices to update in intMod_ch (ind trial, 
all subjects, charity index to update) 
        intOld = intMod_ch(int_ind); %get out the charity preference values 
to update 
        switch modelType 
            case{1,5} 
                intOutcome = abs(~round(belMod(ind-1,:))' - ag_choice(ind-1, 
:)'); % get interpretation of outcome of last trial 
                intNew = intOld + int_lr*(intOutcome - intOld); % get new 
prediction of intent ORIGINAL 
            case{2} 
                intOutcome = abs(~round(belMod(ind-1,:))' - ag_choice(ind-1, 
:)'); % get interpretation of outcome of last trial 
                intNew = intOld + int_lr./((sum(chType(1:ind-
1,:)==repmat(chType(ind-1,:),ind-1,1),1)))'.*(intOutcome - intOld); % same as 
TwExp but without exponent 
            case{3,6} 
                intOutcome = abs(state(ind-1,:)' - ag_choice(ind-1, :)'); % 
get interpretation of outcome of last trial 
                intNew = intOld + int_lr./((sum(chType(1:ind-
1,:)==repmat(chType(ind-1,:),ind-1,1))))'.*(intOutcome - intOld); % same as 
TwExp but without exponent 
            case{4,7} 
                intOutcome = ag_choice(ind-1, :)'; % get interpretation of 
outcome of last trial 
                intNew = intOld + int_lr./((sum(chType(1:ind-
1,:)==repmat(chType(ind-1,:),ind-1,1))))'.*(intOutcome - intOld); % same as 
TwExp but without exponent 
            case{8} 
                intOutcome = (ag_choice(ind-1, :)'<0.5); % get interpretation 
of outcome of last trial (reversing it because we assume reversal) 
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                intNew = intOld + int_lr./((sum(chType(1:ind-
1,:)==repmat(chType(ind-1,:),ind-1,1))))'.*(intOutcome - intOld); % same as 
TwExp but without exponent         
        end 
        intMod_ch(int_ind) = intNew; %stick new intent predictions back in 
the model 
    end 
     
    intMod_ch(intMod_ch>1)=1; 
     
    dataCell{knd}.intMod_ch=intMod_ch; 
    dataCell{knd}.ag_choice = ag_choice; 
     
    %Model CHOICE 
    %pick out charity values, generates probabilistic estimates 
    for ind = 1:size(chType, 1) %for each trial 
        for jnd = 1:size(chType,2) %for each subject 
            chVals(ind,jnd) = intMod_ch(ind, jnd, chType(ind,jnd)); %for 1 
trial, for each subject, chVals = that charity intent 
        end 
    end 
    %translate into choices 
    choiceMod = nan(numTrials-1, numSubj); %empty model for choice numTrials-
1 X numSubjs - we do not include the first trial 
    belNormSelect = belMod(2:end-1,:)>0.5; 
    chSelect = chVals(2:end,:); 
    choiceMod(belMod(2:end-1,:)>0.5) = chSelect(belNormSelect); %choice model 
= intents for the charity on that trial 
    belRevSelect = ~(belMod(2:end-1,:)>0.5); 
    choiceMod(~(belMod(2:end-1,:)>0.5)) = 1-chSelect(belRevSelect); %choice 
model = intents for the charity on that trial 
    dataCell{knd}.choiceMod =choiceMod; 
    %calculate percentage match with mentalizer 
    dataCell{knd}.belModMent = sum(sum(belEst(2:end,:) == (belMod(2:end-
1,:)>0.5)))./numel(belMod(2:end-1,:)); 
    dataCell{knd}.intModMent = sum(sum(intEst(2:end,:) == 
(chVals(2:end,:)>0.5)))./numel(intEst(2:end,:)); 
    dataCell{knd}.choiceModMent = sum(sum(ment_choice(2:end,:) == 
(choiceMod>0.5)))./numel(choiceMod); 
 
    %calculate percentage match with agent 
    dataCell{knd}.belModAg = sum(sum(ag_belief(1:end,:)== (belMod(2:end-
1,:)>0.5)))./numel(belMod(2:end-1,:)); 
    dataCell{knd}.intModAg = 
sum(sum(ag_intent(2:end,:)==(chVals(2:end,:)>0.5)))./numel(chVals(2:end,:)); 
    dataCell{knd}.choiceModAg = sum(sum(ag_choice(2:end,:) == 
(choiceMod>0.5)))./numel(choiceMod); 
 
    %%%individual accuracies 
    for jnd = 1:size(chType,2) %for each subject 
        dataCell{knd}.indivBelMent(jnd) = sum(sum(belEst(2:end,jnd) == 
(belMod(2:end-1,jnd)>0.5)))./numel(belMod(2:end-1,jnd)); 
        dataCell{knd}.indivIntMent(jnd) = sum(sum(intEst(2:end,jnd) == 
(chVals(2:end,jnd)>0.5)))./numel(intEst(2:end,jnd)); 
        dataCell{knd}.indivChMent(jnd) = sum(sum(ment_choice(2:end,jnd) == 
(choiceMod(:,jnd)>0.5)))./numel(choiceMod(:,jnd)); 
    end 
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    %calculate belief fit 
    p1 = dataVals{knd}.bel_est(1:80,:); 
    vals = exp(-sm.*abs(p1-belMod(1:end-1,:))); 
    vals1(1:size(belMod(1:end-1,:),1), 1:numSubj, 1) = 0; 
    vals1(1:size(belMod(1:end-1,:),1), 1:numSubj, 2) = 1; 
    vals2 = sum(exp(-sm.*abs(vals1-repmat(belMod(1:end-1,:),[1,1,2]))),3); 
    bel_pch=vals./vals2; 
    %calculate intent fit 
    all_int_pch = zeros(numTrials, numSubj); 
    for ind = 1:size(intMod_ch, 3) %for each charity 
        char_vals = squeeze(intMod_ch(1:end-1,:,ind)); 
        chInds = find(chType == ind); 
        p1 = dataVals{knd}.int_est(1:80,:); 
        int_pch = p1(chInds); 
        int_qch = char_vals(chInds); %%matrix of intent model predictions 
        vals = exp(-sm.*abs(int_pch-int_qch));    %denominator: 80x49 
        clear vals1 
        vals1(1:size(int_qch,1), 1) = 0; 
        vals1(1:size(int_qch,1), 2) = 1; 
        vals2 = sum(exp(-sm.*abs(vals1-repmat(int_qch,1,2))),2); 
        int_pch=vals./vals2; 
        all_int_pch(chInds) = int_pch; %put probabilites into matrix for 
storage 
        clear vals vals1 vals2 
    end 
    %calculate choice fit 
    p1 = dataVals{knd}.ment_choice(1:80,:); 
    vals = exp(-sm.*abs(p1(2:end,:)-choiceMod));    %denominator: 80x49 
    clear vals1 
    vals1(1:size(choiceMod,1), 1:numSubj, 1) = 0; 
    vals1(1:size(choiceMod,1), 1:numSubj, 2) = 1; 
    vals2 = sum(exp(-sm.*abs(vals1-repmat(choiceMod,[1,1,2]))),3); 
    ch_pch=vals./vals2; 
     
    %this is for other BIC calculation - needed because it needs to be 
80xnumSubj 
    %ordinarily ch_pch generates79xnumSubj 
    clear ch_qch2 
    ch_qch2(:,1:numSubj) = 0.5; 
    ch_qch2(2:numTrials,:) = choiceMod; 
    choiceMod2 = ch_qch2; 
    p1 = dataVals{knd}.ment_choice(1:80,:); 
    vals = exp(-sm.*abs(p1(1:end,:)-choiceMod2));    %denominator: 80x49 
    clear vals1 
    vals1(1:(size(choiceMod,1)+1), 1:numSubj, 1) = 0; 
    vals1(1:(size(choiceMod,1)+1), 1:numSubj, 2) = 1; 
    vals2 = sum(exp(-sm.*abs(vals1-repmat(choiceMod2,[1,1,2]))),3); 
    ch_pch2=vals./vals2; 
     
    e=sum(-log([bel_pch(:);all_int_pch(:);ch_pch(:)])); %summarizing negative 
log likelihood for belief, intent and choice 
    dataCell{knd}.ch_pch2 = ch_pch2; 
    dataCell{knd}.ch_pch = ch_pch; 
    dataCell{knd}.bel_pch=bel_pch; 
    dataCell{knd}.int_pch=all_int_pch; 





numOne = size(dataCell{1}.belMod,2); 
numTwo = size(dataCell{2}.belMod,2); 
  
e = 0; 
for ind=1:numel(dataCell) 
    e=e+dataCell{ind}.e; 
    dataCell{ind}.belModMentALL = (dataCell{1}.belModMent*numOne + 
dataCell{2}.belModMent*numTwo)/(numOne+numTwo); 
    dataCell{ind}.intModMentALL = (dataCell{1}.intModMent*numOne + 
dataCell{2}.intModMent*numTwo)/(numOne+numTwo); 
    dataCell{ind}.choiceModMentALL = (dataCell{1}.choiceModMent*numOne + 
dataCell{2}.choiceModMent*numTwo)/(numOne+numTwo); 
    dataCell{ind}.belModAgALL = (dataCell{1}.belModAg*numOne + 
dataCell{2}.belModAg*numTwo)/(numOne+numTwo); 
    dataCell{ind}.intModAgALL = (dataCell{1}.intModAg*numOne + 
dataCell{2}.intModAg*numTwo)/(numOne+numTwo); 




%construct BIC for belief, intent, choice, combined, by subject 
 
lastCount = 0; 
for ind=1:numel(dataCell) 
    count =size(dataCell{ind}.belMod,2); 
    %overall 
    BIC(1, lastCount + 1: lastCount + count)= sum(-
log([dataCell{ind}.bel_pch(1:80,:);dataCell{ind}.int_pch(1:80,:); 
dataCell{ind}.ch_pch(1:79,:)]))*2+(numParameters*log(80+80+79)-log(2*pi)); 
    %belief 
    BIC(2, lastCount + 1: lastCount + count)= sum(-
log([dataCell{ind}.bel_pch(1:80,:)]))*2+(numParameters*log(80)-log(2*pi)); 
    %intent 
    BIC(3, lastCount + 1: lastCount + count)= sum(-
log([dataCell{ind}.int_pch(1:80,:)]))*2+(numParameters*log(80)-log(2*pi)); 
    %choice 
    BIC(4, lastCount + 1: lastCount + count)= sum(-
log([dataCell{ind}.ch_pch(1:79,:)]))*2+(numParameters*log(79)-log(2*pi)); 
    lastCount = lastCount + count; 
end 
  
end 
 
